THE THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE
IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT

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ABSTRACT

The third person imperative in the Greek New Testament is generally discussed with the second person imperative without distinction. The English language has no form corresponding to the third person imperative, and therefore must employ an adequate substitute to communicate the same meaning and force of the original text. Thus, it is incumbent upon the exegete to discover how the third person imperative functions grammatically and contextually as a distinct form.

I examined every occurrence of the third person imperative in the Greek New Testament in conjunction with the Septuagint and selected sections from first century writers Philo and Josephus. I hypothesized that unless third and second person imperatives functioned differently, at least in some instances, the presence of both forms would be superfluous. Thus, each occurrence was examined with regard to syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

The study demonstrated that the third person does function differently from the second person imperative other than in the expected sense of addressing a third party beyond the immediate listening/reading audience. In actuality, its capacity for this purpose is infrequently employed and easily provided for by other forms. The primary function of the third person imperative is to add emphasis for the immediate audience either with regard to who (in the audience) is responsible to carry out the injunction (what I have called “subject transfers”) or what is to be done by the audience (what I have called “object transfers”).

I also considered how the speakers/writers chose the (present and aorist) “tense” forms used with the third person imperative. I found nothing distinctive about this process in contrast to the second person. However, I did find the traditional view lacking that asserts a direct correspondence between the speakers’/writers’ choice of these two forms and the existence or the non-existence of the action in reality.

Finally, I applied the results of this study to the question of translating the third person imperative into English.
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CHAPTER I

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

The primary purpose of translating is to communicate the meaning of a given text or verbal expression of a source language into a text or verbal expression of a receptor language. There are two essential elements in every language: form (whether oral or written) which includes the phonological, grammatical, and lexical systems of the language, and meaning which is the message the form communicates.¹

There are two fundamental problems in communicating the meaning of the source language into the receptor language. The first is the lack of strict correspondence between the elements of form and meaning in both languages, which is sometimes called “skewing.”² Factors that influence skewing include the multifarious nature of the lexical and grammatical features (including idiomatic and figurative language),³ authorial intent (which may or may not be fully expressed in the form the author has chosen),⁴ and context (which shapes authorial intent and choice of form). This last factor covers all cultural and immediate precipitating influences on the language of the text; that is, it includes all extralinguistic or non-semantic elements. Thus, the meaning of a text is determined by analysis in two categories: semantics (the language of the text itself) and pragmatics (the extralinguistic factors, including authorial intent and context). These two categories must be distinguished, but not separated.⁵

Skewing can be demonstrated by the three moods in English with an imperatival sense: The future indicative form, “You will do your homework,” the subjunctive, “I insist that you finish your homework,” or “If I were you, I would finish the homework,” and the imperative itself, “Do your homework.” On the other hand, imperative forms can have a variety of meanings in addition to command: “Be happy your homework is finished” is hortative (being happy is not subject to control), “Finish your homework and you’ll be happy” is conditional, “All right then, don’t finish your homework” is ironic (the statement is contrary to the intent of the speaker, it might signal resignation or

³ For example, the grammatical construction τὴν δοξὴν τοῦ ἀγίου πνεύματος (Acts 2:38) may be understood either appositionally or subjectively. This form removed from its context does not necessarily correspond to either meaning. Also, the lexical form πνεῦμα taken alone may mean either “spirit” or “wind” (John 3:5 - 6, 8; Heb 1:7).
⁴ The debate over the possibility of recovering authorial intent has no bearing on this discussion. Whatever the author’s intent, it necessarily influenced his or her choice of form. For this debate see Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 1989): 53 - 71; and especially E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity In Interpretation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967).
⁵ Stanley E. Porter argues for this distinction with particular reference to the Greek verbal network, which helps explain the disparity of temporal functions realized from a single verb form (Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood [New York: Peter Lang, 1993]: 97). See my discussion of these categories, pp. 17 - 19.
possibly a threat), “Help me, I’m drowning” is an entreaty (the speaker is in a compromising or submissive position), etc. Each of these examples makes it clear that the form with which an author chooses to convey his or her meaning is dictated by extralinguistic conventions. Forms, removed from their contexts, could assume other meanings.

The second problem communicating the meaning of the source language into the receptor language is a lack of formal correspondence between the two languages. Often there is formal correspondence; that is, the receptor language has a corresponding form. It does not follow, however, that the receptor language most effectively communicates the meaning of the source language by using corresponding forms. Generally, an idiomatic translation (i.e., using the most natural form of the receptor language, whether it corresponds or not) is preferred to a literal translation (i.e., using primarily the corresponding form of the receptor language). This is not to suggest that the source language forms are unimportant in translating. Those forms were natural to, and provided meaningful discourse for, the original audience. Therefore, the translator must capture the meaning and dynamics of the original forms to represent them faithfully in the receptor language. Nida and Taber suggest the following system of priorities in any specific instance of translating: contextual over verbal consistency, dynamic equivalence (“idiomatic”) over formal correspondence, aural over written form, and forms (in the receptor language) best suited for the audience over more prestigious forms.

This problem becomes acute in the case of the Greek third person imperative, for which there is no formal equivalent in English. In the first place, English is a word order and time-based language; Koine Greek is a non-temporal inflectional language. Therefore, meaning is even less influenced by form in English than it is in Greek. In the second place, there is no general agreement on mood theory in English. This is particularly true with regard to the imperative and subjunctive which are often identical in form. Mood should reflect the attitude the speaker/writer has toward the content of his or her expression, yet in both Greek and English this is not always possible to detect.

These problems contribute to ambiguity in some passages. For example, is 1 Cor 11:34 (ἐν οἴκῳ ἐσθίειτο) merely hortative as might be inferred from the NASB (“let him eat at home”), modestly obligatory as in the NIV (“he should eat at home”), or unconditionally obligatory as in the NEB (“eat at home”)? It is possible that each translation intends the same force and assumes that the reader can understand this from the context, but the forms chosen do not communicate this decisively. The evidence demonstrates that the overall choice of forms used by each translation is more precise than would allow for the kind of ambiguity existing among the translations. In other words, the field of choices available to, and used in, each English translation allows for

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7Ordinarily, the author’s immediate audience is aware of these conventions, and therefore essentially understands the content of the message. However, this cannot always be true of the audience receiving the translation; thus, there must be a priority of meaning over form.

8Beekman and Callow, Translating, 19 - 33.

9Eugene A. Nida and Charles R. Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill for the United Bible Societies, 1969): 14, 19 - 32. Under this paradigm, reproduction of the original style is always secondary to reproduction of the original meaning, 12.

10For example, “Crucify him” (imperative), “If you crucify him, he will die” (subjunctive).
enough flexibility to communicate with precision the degree of intensity intended in the third person imperative (see below under “The Question of Mood” and Chapter V). Therefore, the varying intensities implied in the above examples could be understood as intended by the translators. Accordingly, the NEB allows no option—he must eat at home. The NASB and NIV do not seem to make it as binding. This might be an example where one or more of these translations is distorting the force of the passage.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the third person imperative in the Greek New Testament with regard to the two problems identified above: first, how the imperative mood, and the tenses in that mood, function, and second, determining what English forms best communicate the meaning.

The Question of Mood

The English language has three moods: indicative, subjunctive, and (second person) imperative. Each mood is capable of carrying an imperatival force. The NIV New Testament, for example, uses each of these moods in various grammatical structures to translate the Greek third person imperative: the third person subjunctive (ca. 70 percent), the third person indicative (ca. 20 percent), and the second person imperative (ca. 10 percent). However, the various levels of imperatival intensity (see next paragraph) of the imperative mood in Greek are not always reflected by these English structures.

The Greek third person imperative form is inherently neutral with regard to its level of intensity, which must be determined by context. I have accordingly identified three such levels: obligatory (84 percent), hortative (13 percent), and optative (3 percent). In contrast to the Greek imperative, the English grammatical structures chosen to translate it, as well as the context, contribute to the level of intensity.

The example cited above (1 Cor 11:34) illustrates this point. The Greek phrase ἐν ὁίκῳ ἐσθίετω, as it stands alone, reveals little as to the intensity of the writer’s mood. In English translation however, the phrases “let him eat at home,” “he should eat at home,” “he must eat at home,” “eat at home,” “he will eat at home,” etc., standing apart from the context and in comparison to one another, suggest a range of intensity (from hortative to obligatory). Therefore, the varying functions of the imperative mood in Greek can be reflected by all three moods in English; however, the specific grammatical structures themselves (unlike the Greek forms) also contribute to the function of the mood selected and influence the meaning of the text.

11The relationship of the subject to the action of the imperative, “voice,” is generally determined without any difficulty. Attention will be given to voice only as it directly affects understanding, as in some passive imperatives.


13For example, Matt 11:15; Mark 7:10; Rom 14:5; 1 Cor 4:1; 1 Tim 5:9. I also found two second person subjunctives (Acts 13:38; 28:28).

14For example, Matt 8:13; 15:28; Luke 7:7; 2 Thess 3:10; 1 Tim 5:17; 6:2.


16See Chapter III.
The NIV New Testament is uneven in the forms it chooses and the levels of intensity communicated. For example, it appropriately uses the modal auxiliary “let” in subjunctives for most hortative imperatives (Matt 24:15 - 18; John 7:37; 1 Cor 7:15). However, it frequently (in ca. 25 percent of the occurrences) translates obligatory imperatives with the same form (Matt 5:37; Mark 10:9; 1 Cor 1:31; 14:37; Col 3:15 - 16). As there are a number of adequate English forms to communicate the different levels of intensity of the Greek imperative mood, there is no reason to choose those which may mollify the force of the passage.  

The Question of Tense

The question of tense is far more complex than that of mood. It is generally agreed that the temporal sense of the imperative—in every language—is future. Bolinger states this point clearly: “Possibility of compliance and futurity are fundamentally a single criterion. The present and the past cannot be acted upon. The future can.” The forms chosen in English to translate the third person imperative, with rare exceptions, reflect this idea.

This sense of futurity, however, is not a function of “tense,” the category often used to discuss the time of an action; it is a function of the imperatival mood. Mood signals the factuality (indicative mood) or non-factuality (non-indicative moods) of the action. Actually, mood expresses the way the speaker or writer perceives the action, not necessarily the objective reality of it. Thus, mood is subjective, not objective. The imperative orders, encourages, or in some way wills action not perceived as factual at the time of the utterance or writing. Dana and Mantey call it “the mood of volition. It is the genius of the imperative to express the appeal of will to will. . .It expresses neither probability nor possibility, but only intention, and is, therefore, the farthest removed from reality.” However, “the imperative demands realization” in varying degrees of intensity. Thus, the action is realized in the “future,” if at all—it can be rejected (Mark 10:21 - 22) or impossible to obey (John 4:16 - 18). This does not mean that the imperative is essentially a future tense; as with the other non-indicative moods, the imperative is non-temporal.

This raises a question as to the function of the present and aorist tenses used with the third person imperative in the Greek New Testament. If the imperative is non-
temporal in nature, what is the role of the aorist and present tenses in that mood? This is the question around which most of the discussion on the imperative has revolved. However, before I summarize the status of the scholarship on this specific question (see “Critical Issues” below), it will be helpful to look briefly at the general question about the nature of “tense.”

The traditional view believes tense in the indicative mood expresses both time, relative to the utterance (past, present, or future), and the kind of action involved (in progress, completed, or indefinite). In the non-indicative moods only the kind of action is expressed. Yet grammarians recognize that “since the pres. ind. occurs for past, present and future time it is clear that ‘time’ is secondary even in the ind.” It is not morphology alone, but primarily context that determines the time element. Based on these and other considerations, Stanley Porter argues that the only thing indicated by morphology (including the indicative forms) is “aspect,” which refers to, but is not, the kind of action.

“Aspect” (a term first used by classical scholars) is essentially the way the writer or speaker views the action in its context; it is “the author’s reasoned subjective choice of conception of a process.” The term common among New Testament scholars that refers to the kind of action in its objective reality is “Aktionsart.” Three kinds of action have been traditionally identified: punctiliar (momentary) presented by the aorist stem, durative (linear) presented by the present stem, and perfected (completed) presented by the perfect stem. Some scholars deny, however, that action in objective reality can be determined morphologically, and argue that aspect alone is what the verb stem provides. The writer or speaker views the verbal idea in one of three ways: imperfective (in process) presented by the present and imperfect tenses, perfective (as a whole) presented by the aorist tense, and stative (as a state arising from an action) presented by the perfect and pluperfect tenses. McKay adds what he calls an “anomalous” aspect, the future—action viewed as an intention or expectation.

28 Verbal Aspect, 75 - 95. McKay essentially agrees with Porter but challenges some of his interpretations and reminds that even though time is determined by context and not form, “the aspectually determined forms are part of the context, so they cannot be dismissed as making no possible contribution to the temporal effects” (“Time and Aspect in New Testament Greek,” Novum Testamentum 24/3 [1992]: 226).
30 Robertson, Grammar, 823 - 824.
Morphologically-based aspectual theories are not without their critics, but the nuances of the debate are well beyond the scope of this discussion. However, with particular reference to the present and aorist tenses, the results of aspectual research may help better explain the function of these two tenses with the imperative. If the aspectual approach is valid, the aorist (perfective aspect) imperative may do no more than focus on the action simply as a whole (a single event), while the present (imperfective aspect) imperative focuses on the event in progress (thus suggesting repetition, habit, etc.). The more traditional categories of tense, durative (continuing) for the present and punctiliar (momentary) for the aorist, do not accurately reflect the contexts in which they are found. In fact, there is no direct correlation between the present and aorist tenses and the objective action that is referred to by these categories:

One of the most striking characteristics of the aspect in Ancient Greek is that it is essentially subjective: one uses the present-stem because one is concerned with the duration of the action; inversely, the aorist-stem expresses primarily not what is necessarily in itself devoid of duration, but whose duration does not count to the mind of the speaker.

As early as 1895, with particular reference to the imperative in Attic writers, J. Donovan observed that the aorist and present tenses were used interchangeably with regard to the kind of action they were depicting. For example, “the present is used just as freely as the aorist of actions . . . momentary, momentary and single, single occurrences, single or transient.” Similarly, from a study of the dramatic or dynamic uses of the imperative, L. A. Post found “the present may for most verbs replace the aorist for dramatic reasons.” This idea is particularly important for exegesis and translation,

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32For example, Oswald Szemerényi views aspect as “one of the most disputed notions in linguistics, and tense, . . . only slightly less so” (“Unorthodox Views of Tense and Aspect,” Archivum Linguisticum 17 [1969]: 161).


which I hope to make clearer as I consider individual passages in contrast to traditional views of the distinctive functions of the two tenses in the third person imperative (see below under “Critical Issues” and Chapter IV).  

Critical Issues

In his brief article in 1978, Ray Elliott raised some questions concerning the function of the third person imperative in the Greek New Testament. 41 To the best of my knowledge, there has been no extended discussion distinguishing the second and third person imperatives in the New Testament. 42 The consensus among scholars, who have made specific reference to the third person, is that it essentially functions the same as the second person. 43 Generally, they are treated together.

The only major exception is with aorist prohibitions. In the New Testament, second person negative commands are always in the subjunctive mood; third person negative commands retain the imperative. 44 Turner claims “the prohibitive aor. imperative is later than the NT: Horn quotes the first as iii/A.D.” 45 Notwithstanding this apparent anomaly, the consensus suggests—either through silence, as with Turner, or direct comment—“there seems to be no distinguishable difference in meaning” between second person subjunctive and third person imperative prohibitions. 46 Moulton merely passes over the distinction: “Not much need be added as to the use of the 3rd [person imperative]. Here the veto on the aorist in prohibition is withdrawn: we need not stay to ask why.”

There have been attempts to explain the use of both the subjunctive and imperative forms in the imperative. For example, M. W. Humphreys suggests politeness may have been an issue in the classical period. The subjunctive mood was used in second person negative commands to mollify their offensive nature. However, as third person commands were often in reference to absent individuals, speakers were therefore less considerate and might use the imperative. As the language developed, the reason for the distinction was lost sight of and the forms were used indiscriminately (i.e., in the third person). 48 This psychological explanation does not address the problem of the aorist third person imperative employed when the referenced individual is not absent. If politeness

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40 The approach used in this study is inductive. With the various views in mind, the question that needs to be asked in each case is “What does this context reveal?”


43 See, for example, McKay, “Aspect in Imperatival Constructions,” 214 - 216.

44 Matt 6:3; 24:17 - 18; Mark 13:15 (twice) - 16; Luke 17:31 (twice). Third person negative subjunctives are rare in the New Testament (1 Cor 16:11; 2 Cor 11:16; 2 Thess 2:3).


were a concern, a prohibition stated in this context could be regarded as even less polite than if the individual were addressed directly with a second person imperative; at least the latter acknowledges the person’s presence.  

C. W. E. Miller finds Humphreys’ suggestion untenable. Miller argues that to the Greek (and indeed to our own) mind there was no inherent difference of intensity in negative (prohibitions) and positive commands. The distinction (degree of harshness or politeness) is always determined by context—the spirit and position of the persons giving and receiving the command, as well as the nature of the command itself. Miller explains the use of the aorist subjunctive in prohibitions on historical (rather than psychological) grounds—the negated subjunctive developed from the negated injunctive (which were formally identical), and asserts that the aorist subjunctive is “milder” due to the simple fact that it is a subjunctive construction and longer in form than most imperatives. However, the degree of harshness cannot be determined in any given form itself.

Regardless of how this difference between second and third person aorist prohibitions evolved, there is general agreement that formal mood change did not effectively alter meaning, at least by the first century AD. According to Porter, “In most contexts, translations of negated imperatives and negated subjunctives used as prohibitions can be virtually identical.” As the language developed, it also appears that person number did not affect the meaning; a third person command is as strong as a second person command, whether positive or negative. These facts are problematic for translation into English where mood and person do affect the meaning: “The jussive, namely, a third person imperative, ‘let him suffer’ (not permission but command), is highly ambiguous in English.” Thus, one task for the translator is transferring the mood and person of the Greek third person imperative into an English idiom that does not diminish its force or emphasis.

The second difficulty lies more within the Greek itself and centers on the tenses, primarily the aorist and present for the third person imperative. For example, the only difference between the aorist subjunctive and present imperative “is the conception of the action as respects its progress,” which is considered a function of “tense.” It is generally agreed that neither tense nor aspectual usage is affected by change of mood or

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49 See for example Luke 23:35, which is clearly meant to be as impolite as possible.
51 Ibid., 422 - 424. Robertson states that the imperative was the latest of the modes and was simply never strong enough to dislodge the subjunctive in second person aorist prohibitions (Grammar, 941).
52 Laurence Stephens argues that the illocutionary force between μη plus the aorist subjunctive and μη plus the aorist imperative is the same; the two forms “are equivalent in aspectual value and are, in fact, interchangeable without a change of meaning” even in Homer (“The Origins of a Homeric Peculiarity: MH Plus Aorist Imperative,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 113 [1983]: 69 - 78).
54 McKay, “Imperatival Constructions,” 216. See also Porter, Idioms, 55.
56 Burton, Moods and Tenses, 75.
57 Porter, Verbal Aspect, 361
Therefore, one of the major issues that has evolved concerning the imperative is the aspectual nature of commands as it relates to the present and aorist forms. It raises two basic questions. First, what is the difference in the nature of the action called for by the aorist and present imperatives? Second, and inseparably related to the first, how is the nature of the action to be determined? The debate can be narrowed down to basically two approaches: That which stresses grammatical rules (while recognizing “exceptions”), and that which stresses context (while recognizing patterns). This distinction is subtle, but becomes more obvious during the exegesis of specific passages. Those who follow the former approach frequently employ “rules” which allow them to go beyond the data provided by the text in arriving at an interpretation. In some cases, these interpretations are problematic and illogical.

The origin of this debate is a series of articles in The Classical Review (1903 - 1906). W. Headlam, followed by Henry Jackson, took the position that μὴ plus the present imperative meant “stop,” while μὴ plus the aorist subjunctive meant “don’t start.” In response, H. Darnley Naylor and R. C. Seaton found sufficient examples to disprove Headlam’s “canon.” Headlam responded to Naylor’s exceptions by asking, “Might they not almost be looked upon as those exceptions which, according to the proverb, prove the rule?” Moulton endorsed Headlam’s canon noting the obvious exceptions, but was forced to strained interpretations in some cases. Turner backed off the canon to some degree (using terms like “more or less . . . somewhat . . . tend”), and recognized that Moulton may have been “a little over confident in the rules of Aktionsart.” However, Turner later seemed to apply the canon confidently.

Goetchius provides the best summary of the “rules” traditionally recognized for the present and aorist imperatives, although he adds a caveat that the distinctions cannot always be pressed:

The difference in meaning between the present imperative and the aorist imperative is not one of time, but of aspect. The present imperative is progressive or durative, referring to an action already in progress, while the aorist is indefinite or “ingressive,” referring, usually, to an action which is to be commenced. The negatives used with the imperative mood are μὴ and its compounds; the translation of these negative commands or prohibitions parallels that of positive commands: the present imperative is thus used in a prohibition in which someone

58 McKay, “Imperatival Constructions,” 214.
59 See examples referred to in Chapter IV. I stress context over rules. These two approaches are sometimes referred to as “traditional” (stressing grammatical rules) and “functional” (stressing context); Du Plooy, “Aspect,” 157.
64 “Greek Prohibitions,” 31.
65 Grammar, 122 - 126.
66 “The problem of the Aktionsarten of the tenses is by no means solved as yet for the NT” (Grammar, 74 - 75, 78).
is commanded to *stop* doing what he is doing, whereas the aorist imperative is used in prohibitions in which someone is commanded *not to start* doing something.\(^{68}\)

Other aspectual characteristics can be added. For example:

[the aorist] denotes action that is either transient and instantaneous . . ., or to be undertaken but once, . . . [the present] denotes an action already begun and to be continued . . ., or one that is permanent and frequently recurring. Hence [the present] is commonly employed in the measured and dispassionate language of laws and moral precepts, . . . [it] conveys more softness and reserve of expression, and frequently denotes merely advice.\(^{69}\)

Other Greek scholars are more cautious in formulating rules for the imperative. Smyth argues that μη/ with the present imperative is ambiguous and could involve either a command to cease an action in process or to abstain from an action yet in the future. Likewise, μη/ with the aorist subjunctive can mean either.\(^{70}\)

One of the strongest statements against the formulation of “rules” for the imperative—particularly those for prohibitions—is by James L. Boyer; he calls the concept “inadequate and misleading . . . [a] fallacy.”\(^{71}\) According to his analysis of the 174 present imperatives with μη/ in the New Testament, only 38 explicitly indicate previous action in the context, which would permit the translation of “*stop* doing something,” four uses indicate the action has *already* stopped, 100 are general exhortations which at best are ambiguous—in some cases “*stop*” would make little sense, and 32 uses specifically deny previous action.\(^{72}\) The characterizations of the aorist imperative as “urgent,” more “pressing . . . rude . . . ruthless” than the present (see Winer quote above)\(^{73}\) is also criticized on the basis of the fact that the aorist tense—by definition—was non-special (“unbounded”). In addition, such characterizations are not always supported by the contexts in which the aorist imperatives are found.\(^{74}\)

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\(^{70}\) “Classification of Imperatives,” 42 - 43.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 43 - 44.

\(^{72}\) See also Turner, *Grammar*, 75.

\(^{74}\) “Classification of Imperatives,” 45 - 46.
Categorizing Imperatives

New Testament imperatives can be divided into two broad categories. First, *generic* imperatives are not occasion-specific and can be said to apply universally (e.g., Rom 6:12; 1 Cor 16:14). This does not mean that generic imperatives cannot be used in occasion-specific contexts (e.g., 1 Cor 14:40). Second, *specific* imperatives are occasion-specific and apply only in limited contexts (e.g., Matt 9:30; 24:16 - 17). This broad breakdown is not as precise as might be desired; it is often difficult to determine whether or not an imperative is occasion-specific with limited application (e.g., 1 Cor 14:34; 1 Tim 2:11).

In addition, imperatives have been categorized by type. The standard grammars and studies generally recognize about six types. Most are second person (85 percent). First, *commands* (71 percent) and *prohibitions* (negative commands) (11 percent) constitute the largest group. *Requests* (entreaties) and *prayers* make up the second largest group (11 percent). Next are imperatives of *permission* (2 percent). Fourth are *conditional* (“concessive”) imperatives (“Do something and this will follow,” e.g., John 2:19) (1 percent). Fifth, *greetings* using the imperative form of χαίρω occur seven times. A final group of imperatives might best be called *interjections* which are generally exclamatory words of introduction (e.g., άκούστε, ἀγε, βλέπετε). These last two types do not occur in the third person. Thus, for the sake of this discussion four types of imperatives will be considered: command (positive and negative), entreaty (request and prayer), permission, and condition.

More specifically, Judy Glaze categorized the third person imperative in the Septuagint. She found that the third person imperative is most often used to address the second or even the first person, leading her to question the distinction between the second and third person forms and whether they were interchangeable or characterized by precise usage. In a large percentage of occurrences the third person did not even function as an imperative. She arrived at two general categories relevant to this study. First, there were, in a minority of cases, true third person imperatives either with or without an intermediary (real or implied). Second, there were third person acting as second person imperatives. They served four distinct functions: etiquette, intensification of a

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75Voelz calls these two categories “policy commands” and “specified case commands” (“Use of the Present and Aorist Imperatives and Prohibitions in the New Testament” [Ph. D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1977]: 16). In my analysis of the third person I considered them under three broad exegetical categories. A slight majority (125) are classified as “Occasion Specific with Universal Application”; i.e., the imperative addressed a specific situation in the audience, but the imperative is always applicable whenever such an occasion arises (1 Cor 7 is a good example). Around 62 cases are classified as “Occasion Specific with Limited Application”; i.e., the imperatives addressed a specific historical situation governed by immediate needs or cultural considerations (e.g., Matt 9:30; 1 Cor 16:2). Finally, 47 are classified as “General Criterion with Universal Application”; i.e., the speaker/writer was not necessarily addressing an existing situation (although he may have been), but the imperative is presented as a general injunction. Both Matt 5 - 6 and Jas 1 contain examples of these.

76It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to resolve difficulties of this nature.


78“Septuagintal Use,” 4.

79Ibid., 12 - 17.
command, emphasis of sentence elements, and alteration of tone (see particularly my Chapters II and III).

These functions occurred on three levels of imperative intensity: direct imperative, subjunctive, and optative. On the direct imperative level there are five general uses: structural/address/subset transformation, idioms, permission, decrees, and dares. On the subjunctive level both imperatives and subjunctives are used without distinction. The third person imperative functions as a hortatory subjunctive in covenant agreements and as a second person subjunctive addressing royalty, higher social rank, and God. On the optative level it functions primarily in curses and blessings, as well as causation (in prayer) and wishes.80

Glaze found “discernible usage patterns” with regard to the present and aorist tenses. The aorist was heavily favored in addresses to kings and God, and in blessings and curses. The present was favored in decrees and pronouncements of punishment.81 Others patterns may be identified,82 but do not offer much to the discussion as I see it. This is true for two reasons. First, it is difficult to define what percentage of frequency qualifies as a “pattern.” Second, the statistics are partly subjective, depending on the interpreter’s understanding of the passage.

Two broad pattern groupings are insightful and deserve mention, but need not be concentrated on here. First, it is often noted that the present is preferred in maxims (what I called “generic imperatives”) (μη κλέπτε, don’t be a thief), and the aorist in specific situations (“specific imperatives”) (μη κλέψης, don’t steal this or that).83 Second, L. A. Post’s study of Attic dramatists led him to classify three situational groups: facts in control favored the present, speaker (assumed) in control also favored the present, and hearer (called to action by the speaker in a tone of intimacy or friendship) in control (in the sense that he or she has the decision making power) favored the aorist.84

Translating the Third Person Imperative

Pursuant to the preceding, the issues underlying the purpose of this thesis—how the imperative mood, as well as the tenses in that mood, function in the Greek New Testament, and determining the best English forms to communicate the meaning—can be further defined. The task of the translator is transferring the mood and person of the third person imperative into English forms without diminishing its force. A critical matter is how far grammatical “rules” can be stressed in determining the function of the present

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80Ibid., 24 - 51. My approach is more grammatically oriented, and although I identify the same three levels of intensity, our results are differently focused.
81Ibid., 52 - 64. Again our approaches differ. I am not so concerned about “patterns,” and she does not address the issues of how the tenses function with regard to existing action and aspect.
82For example, prayers to God in the New Testament are in the aorist tense over 95 percent of the time, and the only two examples of the present tense (Luke 11:3; 22:42) have aorist variants.
83Smyth, Grammar, 411. James W. Voelz’ statistical results for the New Testament support this observation. Voelz found policy commands favored the present tense in 77 percent of the cases, and specified commands favored the aorist in 70 percent of the cases (“Use of the Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 71 - 80). If taken from the perspective of aspect (see above p. 9), these figures make sense, however, they should not be pushed too far because aorists clearly occur in maxims and presents in specific situations.
84“Dramatic Uses,” 37 - 38. Although this pattern is interesting, it is not universal enough to suggest these factors governed the choices of tense.
and aorist tense forms. Can the translator (interpreter) go beyond the data of the context? Is it legitimate to characterize either tense as to urgency, tone, etc.? How significant are the categories that imperatives appear to fall into? Are there discernible patterns that should be used to influence one’s interpretation of ambiguous passages? In short, can the modern reader learn more about the historical background of the text (Sitz im Leben, authorial intent, etc.) through grammatical rules, characterizations, patterns, etc.?

Presuppositions and Method

The study of language can be broken down into three categories expressing relationships of the linguistic symbols (i.e., words, phrases, clauses and other structural elements): syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax analyzes the relationship of the symbols to one another in a given structural unit. This is particularly important in New Testament Greek because it is an inflected language. Words of the same class (e.g., nouns, pronouns, adjectives, participles) share formal elements (endings) differentiating case, number, and gender which help define a word’s role in a sentence. Therefore, word order can be utilized for emphasis or highlighting various discourse information.

Semantics analyzes the meanings conveyed by particular forms (cases, tenses, verbal aspect, prepositions, etc.) of the symbols (individual words and expressions) and the meaningful structure of the discourse. It concentrates on the language itself expressed in the lexical (“dictionary”) meanings of the symbols, and more recently, in the “semantic domains” of the symbols.

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86 However, inflection is not absolute. For example, the nominative case can serve as the subject or predicate (John 1:14; 1 John 4:8), in apposition (Mark 2:7; Rom 1:1), as a vocative (Luke 8:54; Eph 5:25), for appellation (Luke 2:21; John 1:6), adverbially (Mark 6:39; 8:2), etc. Verbs, which are also inflected, sometimes present interpretive problems. For example, the forms of the second person plural present active or middle/passive indicative and imperative (and subjunctive in -ω verbs) are identical. Mood is determined by context. Mark 14:41, using both active and middle voice verbs, is an interesting example where there is ambiguity of mood: Καθεδέτε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύσεσθε. With few exceptions (KJV, JB, Confraternity Version, NASB margin), the major translations interpret both verbs as indicative in the form of a question. As such, Jesus’ question can be taken ironically or as a concession (he could not seek an answer from sleeping men). Taken imperatively, Jesus’ statement could also be taken ironically, in light of what was about to happen, or as a concession—“Go on and sleep, you are of little use to me now.” The subject of the following obscure verb ἀπέχθη (omitted by Matthew) is unclear, and is not determinative for the mood in the preceding phrase. On ἀπέχθη see Morna Hooker, The Gospel According to Mark (BNTC II, Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1991): 349 - 350.


88 For example, Porter defines the nominative case as “unmarked” or “the case that simply designates” (Idioms, 83 - 84).

89 Lexical meanings themselves (especially in terms of English meaning) are ultimately dependent upon context—consider the verb ἐρχομαι meaning “come” or “go”; thus, semantics implies pragmatics.

90 A “semantic domain” or (field) is “a definable area of cultural experience covered by a set of related terms”; Nida and Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation, 202. Cotterell and Turner state that “the sense of a word depends on the availability of other words in the same field of meaning, and on the word’s relationship to those other words (and their respective meanings)” (Linguistics, 155). See also, Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, eds. Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on
Pragmatics deals with the language symbols of the text in relationship to extralinguistic (non-semantic) factors, especially authorial intent expressed within its own peculiar social and historical context. It is concerned with what a particular form means in a given context. Inasmuch as authorial intent ultimately defines the meaning of the text, the structure and the symbols chosen to express that meaning (syntax and semantics) should not be analyzed apart from pragmatics.  

It is a presupposition of this thesis that context, rather than a mechanical system of rules (even with “exceptions”) or inductively acquired statistics, governs the meaning of any discourse expression (from a single word to the entire discourse). Unless a “rule” or statistic is supported by all the incontrovertible evidence (which, with rare exceptions, is not the case), the interpreter should not feel the liberty to apply the rule or statistic to ambiguous or neutral cases, which are many. Such practices have often led to strained, if not fallacious, interpretations. The circles of context range from the individual words chosen by the speaker and/or writer, the clauses and sentences he forms with them, the paragraphs, the chapters, the entire literary work, and even the collection of works by the author, to all the external factors (“pragmatics”) affecting the final expression. This last circle of context becomes particularly acute in the case of imperatives because even the tone of voice and the body language of the speaker (and possibly other people in his immediate environment) help shape the meaning of his words. Because this is impossible for modern readers to know with certainty, there is frequently an element of ambiguity with imperatives.

According to these three categories, I have inductively examined the third person imperative in the New Testament, with regular reference to the Septuagint, Philo, and Josephus. I have included the first two categories under “Syntactic and Semantic Categories” in Chapter II, and the third (pragmatics) under “Pragmatic Categories” in Chapter III. Chapter IV addresses the function of the present and aorist verb forms in light of each category. The final chapter attempts to draw all this together to find the best English forms to communicate the author’s intentions. As each category inherently

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91As difficult as the pragmatic task might be, it must be included. The traditional inclination toward “semantic autonomy” (whether consciously practiced or not) and the modern concept of “semantic mutability” (meaning of the text changes from era to era and/or reader to reader) must be rejected. Understanding the meaning of the text intended by its author is the primary goal of the interpretive task. See Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 1 - 23.

92This is not to suggest those who appeal to “rules” and/or statistics use them without regard to context, as “exceptions” to the rules and “statistics” inherently imply. However, there is often a premature readiness to employ rules (as if universal) thereby truncating the exegetical process and saying more (or less) than the author intended. Examples of this are cited throughout this thesis.

93With reference to verbal aspect in Ancient Greek (although the same is true in Koine), McKay states, “it is impossible to assess aspectual matters by simple statistical analysis” ("Aspects," 58).

94Examples are considered in the course of this thesis.

95For example, it is reasonable to conclude that the “tone” of Jesus’ words ὁ ἔχων ὑπὸ ἀκοσμάτῳ to the seven churches of Asia Minor (Rev 2 - 3) ranges from impassioned encouragement (2:11; 3:13) to harsh warning (3:22). However, the tone of Paul’s words to the Corinthians is often ambiguous. How resolute is the apostle about the Corinthians eating at home (1 Cor 11:34, see above pp. 6 - 7)?

96Thus, Chapter II focuses on lexical and grammatical data, while Chapter III attempts to understand authorial intention in context.
involves the other, there is overlapping between chapters, however, the distinctions remain.
CHAPTER II

SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC CATEGORIES
OF THE THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

There are 234 occurrences of the third person imperative in the Greek New Testament. Although far less frequent than the second person imperative, it is highly visible, occurring approximately once in every thirty-four verses. The highest concentration is found in James (once in every 7.2 verses), while the lowest is found in Hebrews (once in every 151 verses, only two occurrences). Both the Pauline and Petrine material demonstrate above average usage (once in every 20 and 15 verses respectively).

It is difficult to draw a significant conclusion from these observations, other than that which is already obvious: the third person imperative, like the second person, generally occurs in paraenetic contexts, whether in verbal discourse (as in the Gospels, Acts, and Revelation) or epistolary form. In this sense, the third person imperative exhibits the same general characteristics as the second person imperative and other imperatival forms that define paraenesis. Reinforcing this is the employment of the third person imperative as a substitute for other imperatival forms in an immediate context, parallel passages, Septuagint quotations, and textual variants. Therefore, it is

97There are 119 words used, including ten hapax legomena. The most frequently occurring words are ἤκοψα and εἰμί (16 each), and γίνομαι (15). Five words occur five times each. Figures are based on B. Aland, K. Aland, J. Karavidopoulos, C. M. Martini, and B. M. Metzger, eds. The Greek New Testament (4th rev. ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1993. For a complete listing of occurrences, see APPENDIX A.

98There are ca. 1,400 second person imperatives (approximately one in every 5.6 verses), although some of the present plural forms may be understood as indicatives. Interestingly, the third person imperative occurs at essentially the same rate in both the New Testament and the Septuagint—once in every thirty-three verses for the latter, based on the text of Alfred Rahlf (Septuaginta. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979).

99The Gospel of John also has a very low concentration (once in every 126 verses). There are no occurrences in 1 Thessalonians, Philemon, 2-3 John, or Jude.

100The average ratio of use by author is 1/49 based on traditional categories of authorship. In addition to those given above, the ratios are: Matthew 1/32, Mark 1/52, Luke-Acts 1/58, and the Johannine material 1/57. As would be expected, paraenetic material has a higher ratio than narrative material. Interestingly, both 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians have high concentrations (approximately once in every nine verses) while 2 Timothy and 2 Corinthians have low concentrations (once in every 89 and 64 verses respectively).

101For example, excluding non-paraenetic forms such as ἀπασίασαςθε, there are 84 imperatives and other imperatival forms in Paul’s epistle to the Romans. Only ten occur in the first eleven chapters (the “doctrinal” section), while 74 occur in the remainder (paraenetic section) of the epistle. This same pattern is also followed in Ephesians and Colossians which also have clearly defined paraenetic sections.

102In legal material in the Septuagint, for example, the third person imperative is often juxtaposed to the future indicative (Lev 20:9 - 21, see particularly v. 16: καὶ γυνὴ ἡτίς προσελεύσεται πρὸς πᾶν κτήνος μισθοθήκη αὐτήν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀποκτενεῖτε τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὸ κτήνος, θανάτω θανατούσθουσαν, ἐνοχοί εἰσιν). In Eph 5:25 - 33 the husband’s responsibility to his wife is expressed by three different imperatival forms of the verb ἀγαπάω: second person imperative (v. 25), infinitive (v. 28), and third person imperative (v. 33). Judy Glaze also demonstrates this from parallel constructions of Hebrew poetry (“Septuagintal Use,” 18 - 21); see Rom 15:11 with Ps 116:1.

103At the crucifixion scene Matt 27:22 - 23 has the aorist passive third person imperative (σταυροθήμω), Mark 15:13 - 14 has the aorist active second person imperative (σταυρόροσον), and Luke
evident that the third person imperative can have at least the same imperatival force as other forms. However, as I intend to demonstrate in what follows, the third person often adds an element of emphasis that serves to intensify or focus the imperative for certain individuals.

There have been few attempts to classify third person apart from second person imperatives. However, a careful examination of the third person imperative suggests much can be added as to its use in contrast with the second person imperative.

James Boyer’s classifications of the third person are sometimes questionable. For example, in the commands addressed to the immediate audience (Indirect Command to “You”) he includes those that refer to “some part of you” (Matt 5:16; 6:10) as the “simplest and most obvious.” However, he offers no explanation for this usage or why it is so “obvious,” and he fails to make a distinction between the potential parties so addressed. In some cases, his classifications are incorrect. For example, under “What is Required of a Third Party” he includes Matt 18:17. However, it is clear from the context that the responsible party is the listening audience; they are being commanded to treat the third party—the subject of the imperative—in a particular way; the third party is not being commanded to do anything. In fact, the subject of this third person command becomes the direct object of the action inherent in the command (see below under Conditional Constructs and Chapter III).

Judy Glaze’s study, on the other hand, is far more helpful. However, there are some significant differences between the use of the third person imperative in the Septuagint and the New Testament. For example, nearly one-third of the occurrences in the Septuagint are in poetic material, whereas the same is essentially nonexistent in the New Testament. At the same time, conditional constructs with a third person imperative in the apodosis comprise nearly one-quarter (54) of the occurrences in the New Testament, but are uncommon in the Septuagint.

This high frequency of conditional constructs induced me to analyze the third person imperative syntactically and semantically before attempting to consider it pragmatically.

23:21 has the present active second person imperative (σταυρού). See also Luke 7:7 (ἰαθήτω) with Matt 8:8 (ἰαθήσεται) where the imperative and future forms of ἱάμαι have an obligatory force in that the centurion believes a healing must occur if Jesus answers his request (optative force of εἴπε ἵνα λόγω). Jesus, having marveled at the centurion’s faith, responds with a third person imperative (with obligatory force): Ὑπέρε, ἐπιστευεῖς γενηθήτω σοι (“Go, it must be done as you have believed”).

Of 17 Old Testament passages cited, the Septuagint has nine third person imperatives, six second person imperatives (Pss 116:1 and 33:13-17 cited in Rom 15:11 and 1 Pet 3:10-11 respectively), one future indicative (Deut 24:1 cited in Matt 5:31), and one optative (Ps 108:8 cited in Acts 1:20c).

Third person imperative variants are found for the second person imperative (Phil 2:5; 2 Tim 3:1), future indicative (Matt 20:26; Mark 10:43; Luke 7:7), present indicative (Rom 14:2; 1 Cor 14:38; Jas 2:13; 1 John 2:27), present participle (1 Cor 4:14; Phil 2:4), and aorist infinitive (1 Cor 7:10).

There is a significant distinction between Jesus addressing his disciples (Matt 5:16) and disciples addressing God (Matt 6:10).

Over one-third (87) if implied conditions are included.

I was only able to locate 33, less than four per-cent of the total. Glaze discusses “the conditional clause type” as the means of expressing “the pronouncement of punishment, a special case of decree” (“Septuagintal Use,” 33-36). However, only two of the eight examples she cites are formally conditional constructs, and the remainder do not even qualify as implied conditions.
I have identified three general classifications of the third person imperative with respect to its relationship to the other elements in its structural unit: emphatic subject transfer, emphatic object transfer, and conditional construct.\footnote{The conditional construct classification could be considered a sub-group of the emphatic subject transfer classification (with a few exceptions), but it has sufficient distinguishing characteristics to be considered separately. For a complete listing of third person imperatives in each classification see APPENDIX B.}

**Emphatic Subject Transfer**

Nearly one-half (114) of the third person imperatives in the New Testament are in this classification. In this class, the subject of the imperative is the result of a “transfer” of a subject generally from an implied (or actual) second person imperative,\footnote{Although it is in a poetic parallelism, Rom 15:11 quoting Ps 116:1 is a good example of an actual shift from a second person to a third person imperative retaining the same subject: Αἴειτε, πάντα τά ἑθνη, τὸν κύριον καὶ ἐπανεσάστωσαν αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ λαοί. Barclay M. Newman and Eugene A. Nida suggest the change to the third person adds emphasis: “praise the Lord . . . praise him very much” (A Handbook on Paul’s Letter to the Romans [New York: United Bible Societies, 1973]: 276).} or other imperatival form,\footnote{In Exod 16:29 there is a good example of a subject transfer from both a second person imperative (ἰδεῖτε) and a second person future indicative (καθησεσθε) to a third person imperative (ἐκπονεσθε).} in the same context.\footnote{Glaze makes reference to this classification, but without considering the various types of construction (“Septuagintal Use,” 27 - 30). There is a tendency to confuse syntactical and pragmatic categories in Glaze’s work because discussions on structural transfers, discourse markers, idioms, permission, degrees, etc. are not sufficiently isolated from one another. See especially her Chapter IV.} The third person allows the writer/speaker to shift the focus to certain individuals in the audience,\footnote{This is well illustrated in Exod 9:8. The audience is clearly defined: Ἐστεν δὲ κύριος πρὸς Μωυσῆν καὶ Ααρών. The full audience is addressed with a second person imperative: λέξετε ὑμεῖς πλήρεις τὰς χέιρας αἰθαλής καμινικαίς. Both Moses and Aaron were to take ashes from the furnace, but only Moses was to scatter them: καὶ πασάτῳ Μωυσῆς εἰς τὸν σῶμαν κτλ. The third person imperative (πασάτο) enabled the subject transfer without any loss of imperatival force, indeed it may intensify the significance of only Moses scattering the ashes: “but only Moses is to scatter the ashes.” The next verse provides a good illustration of the Emphatic Object Transfer (see n. 153).} or extend it beyond the audience. In this sense, the third person (singular or plural) imperative is more effective and emphatic than the second person (plural) imperative, which tends to mollify its own force to each individual in the audience.\footnote{By “implied” audience I mean those who are intended or would be expected to hear or read the imperative, whether or not they were in the immediate listening or reading audience. There are rare cases where the listening/reading audience is not directly responsible for carrying out the imperative, but is expected to communicate the command to the responsible parties (Acts 16:37; 24:20). This is what Glaze refers to as a “true third person imperative . . . through an intermediary” (“Septuagintal Use,” 12). The subject transfers in 1 Tim 2:11; 3:10b, 12; 4:12; 6:1 - 2 and Titus 2:15 presumably had to be communicated to the responsible parties by Timothy and Titus respectively. However, they might be considered “implied”}
There are two basic grammatical constructions used to make a subject transfer. The first is the **determinate nominative construct**, under which third person imperatives are classified. In this case, the subject of the imperative is defined in the immediate context by an articular nominative form which is generally a participle, but may also be an adjective, a noun, or an elided form (usually with an independent definite article). In a few cases the subject is defined by an anarthrous nominative form, yet it is still determined as a specifically named subject among the listeners/readers. This type of construction tends to narrow or limit — thus, it is determinate — the focus of the imperatives to each individual or groups within the audiences.

Luke 22 has examples of an adjective and participles used by Jesus at his last Passover meal: "ο Μείζων ἐν ὑμίν γινέσθαι ὡς ὁ νεώτερος . . . ὁ ἔχων βαλλάντιον ἄρατο, δούμιος καὶ τίμην, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔχων ποιλησάτο τὸ ὑμάτιον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄγορασάτο μάχαιραν (vv. 26, 36).

It is clear Jesus is addressing his apostles; he could have as well used second person imperatives. However, the singular third person imperatives in conjunction with the determinate nominatives force each apostle to examine himself. In the case of this audience, it is likely the first imperative (v. 26) would apply to each of them, while the remaining imperatives (v. 36) would conceivably apply to only some of them.

In Matt 24 Jesus predicts a catastrophic event privately (κατ’ ιδίαν) to his disciples (vv. 3 - 4). Matthew directly draws every reader into the discussion with an

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**Raw Text References**

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See also Jer 9:22 - 23. Occasionally the subject antecedent to the imperative is somewhat removed (e.g., Matt 27:42 with v. 40; Acts 16:37 with v. 35). The participial constructions are common in legal material (randomly) selected from Josephus (Ant. 4.267, 269, 271 - 272, 277, 283, 285). For an articular nominative in Philo see Deus Imm. 81 (ὅς τελεστέραν ξητείτω λαβεῖν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος).

Note the following determinate nominative (ὁ ἡγούμενος) probably taking the same imperative (γινέσθαι), which is elided.

Accordingly, the NIV translates v. 36, "if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don’t have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one." See also Luke 3:11. It is generally the case, however, that the injunctions apply, at least, to the whole immediate audience (cf. John 8:7).

The event is likely the fall of Jerusalem (AD 70) throughout the chapter, rather than the final parousia of Christ; however, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis and has little bearing on
emphatic subject transfer: ὁ ἀναγινώσκων νοεῖτω (v. 15). Immediately following are three third person imperatives with the subjects defined by elided determinative nominatives: οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ φευγέτωσαν . . . ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ δόματός μὴ καταβάτῃ . . . οἱ ἐν τῷ ἁγρῷ μὴ ἐπιστρέψατο (vv. 16 - 18).

Occasionally a simple noun form is used to determine the subject of the imperative. For example, in 1 Corinthians 7 Paul is addressing a number of marital problems. In v. 3 he commands, τῇ γυναικὶ ὁ ἄνδρα τὴν ὀφελήν (“marital duty,” NIV) ἀποδίδοτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ἄνδρι. In this way, Paul narrows the command to each husband and wife in the Corinthian church. A plural can also be used when singling out particular groups (1 Cor 14:34).

Infrequently, the reference is to a specific individual. In 2 Cor 10:11 Paul uses the determinative adjective ὁ τοιοῦτος as the subject of λογιζέσθω. The immediate antecedent is φησίν (v. 10), which likely reaches back to τίς in v. 7. The singular may refer to all those of the opposition “personalized as a single number” or an individual viewed as “the ringleader of the opposition.”

On rare occasions, the subject of the imperative is difficult to identify grammatically. The final two third person imperatives in 1 Cor 7 (v. 36) are in a rather complex conditional construct. The sentence begins with a protasis of a first class condition (εἰ δὲ τις ἀσχημονεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν παρθένον αὐτοῦ νομίζει), followed by a protasis of a third class condition (ἐὰν ἦν ὑπέρακμος; the subject is taken from the indirect object of the preceding protasis). The apodosis of the third class condition (καὶ οὕτως ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι, acting as a future indicative anticipating the action to be taken in γαμεῖτωσαν) immediately follows, preceding the apodosis of the first class condition (ὁ θέλει ποιεῖτο). It appears that the marriage of the two parties is being discussed.

Thus, Paul adds γαμεῖτωσαν, which might be the apodosis of an implied


124 This statement implies a pre-70 date for writing; otherwise, this statement and the warnings that follow would have little meaning to the reader.

125 The plural in v. 16 is necessary for contextual consistency with the singular imperatives that follow. The elided forms are likely ὄντες (v. 16) and ὄν (vv. 17 - 18). See also Mark 13:14 - 16 and Luke 21:21 (which uses only plurals).

126 For examples using a simple noun form in the Septuagint see 2 Kings 14:11 - 12, 18, 24. Jas 1:7 has both an articular noun and a participle as referents for οἰέσθω (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος referring back to v. 6, ὃ διακρινόμενος).

127 This is well illustrated in Josh 6:5 - 9. In their assault on the walls of Jericho, πάς ὁ λαὸς ἄμα were commanded to shout (ἀνακραγέτο) (v. 5). However, οἱ μάχημαι are singled out with παραπορευέτωσαν (vv. 7, 9), likewise ἑπτά ἱερεῖς with παρελθέτωσαν (v. 8). Hence, the third person allows for a shift of emphasis by transferring different subjects to the imperative.

128 See Josephus Ant. 4.254 - 256.


130 Therefore, the desire enjoined in ποιεῖτο is restated in γαμεῖτωσαν. The relative in the following verse (ὁ δὲ . . . παρθένον) supports this idea. The apostle cannot be enjoining ἀσχημονεῖν with ποιεῖτο. Generally, ποιεῖτο is taken as permissive, see James A. Brooks and Carlton L. Winery, Syntax of New Testament Greek (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1979): 128; Burton, Moods and Tenses, 81; Young, Intermediate, 145. Most translations agree with the permissive idea by using the subjunctive with the modal auxiliary “let” for both imperatives. The NIV is stronger using the modal auxiliary “should” for both imperatives. However, Paul is not giving permission; given the conditions, there are no options (see also v. 9).
or elliptical condition (εἴ θέλουσιν γαμεῖν). Although this awkward structure is problematic, the imperative γαμεῖτοσαν is an emphatic subject transfer determined from the indefinite nominative τίς (with θέλει) and the implied nominative in Ἡ (from τὴν παρθένον).

The idiomatic expression ὁ ἔχειν ὧτα ἀκουέτω occurs, in various forms, 15 times in the New Testament. Ezekiel 3:27 (ὁ ἀκούων ἀκουέτω, καὶ ὁ ἀπειθῶν ἀπειθεῖτω) might serve as a background for Jesus' words. In Ezekiel, “hearing” is set in opposition to “disobeying.” Thus, “hear” means “obey.” The third person imperatives are affirmations of the preceding present participles addressed to Ezekiel suggesting that the coming judgment is imminent and nothing will change those who are now hearing (obeying) or disobeying; thus, the imperatives have only a hortative force for Ezekiel.

As typical in the Old Testament, the Ezekiel passage uses the word ἀκούω in a context of the revelation of God’s Word (cf. Deut 4:1, 10; 32:1-2; Isa 50:10; Mic 6:1). Hearing is a prevalent feature of biblical faith. To hear is to receive by faith the Word of God and to obey its demands. Not to hear is to reject the Word and its call to repentance (Jer 7:13; Hos 9:17). Unlike the words spoken to Ezekiel, Jesus’ utterances are obligatory upon the listeners. In each context he is calling for acceptance of and obedience to the revealed Word of God. Similarly, in the New Testament, many uses of the second person imperative and other forms of ἀκούω carry the same force demanding obedience.

The second basic grammatical construction used to make a subject transfer is the indeterminate nominative construct, under which 39 third person imperatives are classified. In this case, the subject of the imperative is defined in the immediate context by an indeterminate nominative form. Three adjectives (ἐκκατοστος, πάπας, and its negated antonym μηδεῖς), the indefinite pronoun (τίς), the relative pronoun (ὅς), and the anarthrous generic noun ἄνθρωπος are each used substantively. Such nominatives tend to extend the focus of the imperative beyond the audience as a whole to

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131 Or ἔχειν θελῆσωσιν γαμῆσαι. This complexity might explain the variant γαμεῖτο in D F G 1505 pc d vg sy.

132 With one exception (Rev 13:9), it is always from Jesus—Mark 4:23 and Rev 13:9 as indefinite conditions (see below); Mark 4:9 as an indeterminate subject transfer (see below); Matt 11:15; 13:9, 43; Luke 8:8; 14:35; Rev 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22 as determinate subject transfers. I also located five places the idiom was added in some MSS (Matt 25:29; Mark 7:16; Luke 12:21; 13:9; 21:4). The fact that this idiom occurs in these different forms suggests they are sometimes interchangeable. As stated above (n. 111), conditional constructs are generally a form of subject transfer (see below under Conditional Constructs); likewise, these subject transfers can be considered implied conditional constructs.


136 In one case, an accusative is used (1 Cor 7:17).

137 Beekman and Callow discuss the need in some cultures to avoid negatives and to translate with a positive antonym (from μηδεῖς to πᾶς) (Translating, 183 - 184).

138 As might be expected, with the exception of two cases (Rom 15:11; 1 Tim 6:1 cf. 1 Esd 2:4), the forms are singular.
everyone, and thus, concomitantly, narrowing the focus to everyone in the audience. In some cases (with ἐκαστὸς and τίς) this effect is intensified and individualized for the audience when a substantive is conjoined with a partitive genitive (ὁμών, ἡμῶν) or is contiguous with a dative of location (ἐν ἑμῖν).

The effect of this construction is to universalize the command, and force each individual in the listening/reading audience to have a sense of personal responsibility to the injunction. Thus, “every person must be subject to superior authorities” (Πᾶσας τιμὴν ἐξουσίας ὑπερεχούσας ὑποτασσέθω, Rom 13:1); “because of acts of fornication, each man must have his own woman, each woman must have her own man” (διὰ δὲ τὰς πορνείας ἐκαστὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ἐχέτω καὶ ἐκάστη τὸν ᾦδον ἄδρα ἐχέτω, 1 Cor 7:2); “[each] person must examine himself and so eat of the bread and drink of the cup” (δοκιμαζέτω δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀρτοῦ ἐσθιέτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ποτηρίου πίνετω, 1 Cor 11:28); “for not anyone of you is to suffer as a murder . . .” (μὴ γάρ τις ὁμών πασχέτω ὡς φονεύς κτλ., 1 Pet 4:15); and “whoever divorces his wife, must give her a certificate of divorce” (Ὁς εἰκοσικατάσσω τοις ἐντολαῖς της εὐλογίας ἐν πᾶσιν, ἐπειδὴ τίς τοις ἐντολαῖς διαφανείᾳ ἐπεξεργάζομαι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸς ἐντολαῖς ἐνθισμόν ἔχω, Rom 13:1).\(^{139}\)

\(^{139}\)Acts 2:38; Rom 15:2; 1 Cor 16:2; Eph 5:33; Jas 3:13; 5:13 - 14; 1 Pet 4:15; Exod 16:29; 35:10. See Chapter III under “Two Case Studies” for more discussion on the effect of this construction in Acts 2:38.

\(^{140}\)The “universalizing” effect is the same regardless of the view one takes concerning the phrase ἐξουσίας ὑπερεχούσας. The traditional view takes it to refer to civil governing authorities—although the place of 13:1 - 7 in the overall context is problematical, see C. É. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, vol. 2, IX - XVI (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1979; reprint, 1982): 651 - 655; Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (Trans. and ed. George W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980): 350 - 354. Mark Nanos takes the provocative view of Romans set strictly within its Jewish context and suggests 13:1 - 7 is a reference to the synagogue authorities under whom Paul’s readers would still be assembling either in the synagogues or Jewish homes under synagogue authority (Mystery, 289 - 336). In either case, the universalizing effect is intended to address the audience of believers (immediate and “implied,” see n. 117), without respect to the question of amenability of unbelievers to the law of God. It is also under this category that only those who might qualify as the subject of the imperative are responsible. Thus, if Nanos is correct, it would apply only to those under the influence of the Jewish synagogue, which initially may have been most believers.

\(^{141}\)Clearly, Paul is referring only to the subjects stipulated. The prepositional phrase διὰ κτλ. may refer to acts of fornication already practiced (either in the church or society at large) or only as a potential (among unmarried believers). Regardless, marriage provides the outlet for sexual desire. Paul is speaking in general terms here and is not mandating that every person marry (as is clear from the context, vv. 6 - 9). However, if one cannot avoid fornication and maintain self-control, the only option is to marry. Thus, the imperative is obligatory for everyone under those conditions. The reason for the command makes this equivalent to a condition: “If one cannot avoid fornication, he/she must have his own wife/husband,” or “If such a man has a wife, he must remain married. If he does not have a wife, he must marry one, and . . .” In Josephus Bell. 5.257 the audience is directed to follow their own opinions as the facts may lead them—νοεῖτο δὲ ὅπῃ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐκαστὸς ἀνεταί. This obviously means only those privy to the facts as they have been presented are included in the adjective ἐκαστὸς. Nevertheless, the subject is universalized by the adjective with reference to anyone qualified to respond to the imperative.

\(^{142}\)In Jas 1:19 both nominative forms are conjoined: ἐστω δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος (every person) ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκούσα. For a similar construction see Exod 35:10, Καὶ πᾶς σοφὸς (every wise person) τῇ καρδίᾳ ἐν ἑμῖν (dative of location), ἐλθὼν ἐργαζέσθω πάντα ὡς συνέταιξε Κύριος.

\(^{143}\)The other occurrences of τίς in this construct are in questions, which might be understood as implied conditions with the subordinating conjuctions elided (1 Cor 7:18; Jas 5:13 - 14). In Jas 3:13 τίς easily suggests εἰ τίς (as in 489. 2298 al; Nil). Taken as an interrogative pronoun (τίς) with the verb [is] elided the sense is essentially the same: “Who [is] wise . . .,” compared to indefinite pronoun (τοις) “[Is]
The relative constructions in Mark 4:9 (Ὄς ἔχει ότα ἀκούειν ἀκούετο) and Luke 17:31a (ὅς ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῦ δώματός . . . μὴ καταβάτω) demonstrate the close relationship between the various nominative forms of subject transfers. Mark uses the relative form of an idiom that is also framed with an articular participle (Matt 11:15; Luke 8:8; Rev 2:7; etc.) and as a conditional construct (Mark 2:23; Rev 13:9). Luke, in the same verse, has a similar subject transfer defined by an independent definite article (ὁ ἐν ἀγρῷ ὁμοίως μὴ ἐπιστρεψάτω).

The negated adjective μηδείς likewise universalizes the injunction: ὡστε μηδείς καυχάσθω ἐν ανθρώποις (1 Cor 3:21), σο μηδείς πειραζόμενος λεγέτω ὅτι Ἄπο θεοῦ πειράζωμαι (Jas 1:13). Jas 1:13 could easily be converted to a determinate subject transfer: ὁ πειραζόμενος μὴ λεγέτω κτλ. Thus, the negative adjective also demonstrates the close relationship of the various nominative constructs in subject transfers.

Emphatic Object Transfer

There are 66 third person imperatives in this class, wherein the subject of the third person imperative is the result of the “transfer” of an object (direct or indirect), generally from an implied (or actual) second person imperatival context. The subject of the second person imperatival action remains the same, but the object is brought forward by the third person as the subject for emphasis. The party responsible for carrying out the imperative is the listening/reading audience except in the few cases where the speaker himself is also responsible, or where an intermediary is used.

anyone wise . . .” For other examples not in questions see Josephus Ant. 4.219 (which easily converts to a conditional construct, ἀν δὲ τις ψευδομαρτυρήσῃ πιστεύῃ παραγέτῳ κτλ, see also 14.258), 271, 273, 276 (with a prohibitive imperative); 16.111. In Deut 20:5 - 8 there is an uncommon occurrence of subject transfers from determinate nominative constructs in questions (none occur in the New Testament). The identical formula τις ὁ ἄνθρωπος is followed by various actions of the subject and the identical commands πορευέσθω καὶ ἀποστραφήσω. The commands are immediately followed by consequences for failure to fulfill them. This uncommon question/imperative sequence is repeated four times, and each question could easily be converted into the protasis of the more common indefinite conditional construct (see pp. 35 - 37). See also Isa 50:8, 10.

144 Because ὅς can have the same sense as ἐὰν τις, this can be considered an implied conditional construct. See Smyth, Greek Grammar, 576; Burton, Moods and Tenses, 119. However, it is not strictly a condition and should therefore be understood as such only as the context permits; see Robertson, A Grammar, 961 - 962. Matt 5:31 is the only such example in the New Testament, but in the Septuagint the construction is more frequent (see especially Lev 20:9 - 16 which alternates relative and conditional constructs).

146 See also Lev 24:16 - 21. However, the nature of the imperative θανατούσθω in this passage and Lev 20 (n. 144) causes it to be classified under Emphatic Object Transfer (see below).

147 See also Glaze’s discussion about sentence structure transformation (“Septuagintal Use,” 25 - 27).
allows the writer/speaker to shift his focus to the object of the subject’s actions: “Shine your light” (second person) to “Your light must shine” (third person), “Cease being angry by sunset” to “The sun must not set on your anger.” That object may also be another person: “Put him to death” (second person) to “He must be put to death” (third person).  

The grammatical structures employed to make object transfers are more complex than those with subject transfers. The immediate, and sometimes extended, context is the determining factor for identifying the “true” subject responsible for carrying out the imperative. In this sense, this classification is more a product of pragmatic rather than simple syntactical considerations.

In the majority of cases (41), the subjects responsible for carrying out the action of third person imperatives in the object transfer class are defined by a second person construct in the immediate context; i.e., the third person imperative is conjoined or contiguous with a second person pronoun and/or a second person imperatival form.

The most obvious of this type are those where some action, possession or part of the responsible party’s body is the object transferred as the subject of the imperative: 

λαμψάτω τὸ φῶς ὑμῶν (Matt 5:16); ἔστω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ νάι, οὐ= οὔ (Matt 5:37); μὴ γνώτω ἢ ἀριστερά σου τί ποιεῖ ἢ δεξιά σου (Matt 6:3); πᾶσα πικρία καὶ θυμός καὶ ὀργή καὶ κρυψύτη καὶ βλασφημία ἄρθητο ὑμῶν (Eph 4:31). John 14:1 is a good example where both a second person pronoun and...

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150Possibly, this is the case when Paul writes to Timothy (1 Tim 3:10a; 5:16b - 17). The use of third person imperatives where an intermediary is used is questionable in the New Testament, and uncommon in the Septuagint. For examples in the Septuagint see Glaze, “Septuagintal Use,” 12 - 15. However, many of her examples are questionable (See n. 161). Of course, those cases where an intermediary is used to request something from God do not strictly require one, although the speaker may perceive so (Exod 9:28; 10:17; Num 21:7). Philo writes specifically of “mediators” (μεσιτῶν) in such a case (Som. 1.143 with Rev. Div. Her. 19.4; Poster. C. 143.8; Exod 20:19).

151It is clear the subject of this type of imperative (τελευστήσατο) cannot be expected to carry it out (Matt 15:4; Mark 7:10; Gen 38:24; 44:9; Lev 20:10 - 16; 2 Chron 23:14; Josephus Ant. 4.202). A dead man cannot avenge himself against his own attacker (Josephus Ant. 4.277).

152With emphatic subject transfers, the party responsible for fulfilling the command is always the subject of the third person imperative. With emphatic object transfers the subject of the third person imperative cannot be responsible for execution of the command, either because it is not a person or because the person as the subject could not logically be expected to carry out the command. In actuality, the subject of a third person imperative in this class is the object of an implied second person command. The passive voice is a good indicator of an object transfer pointing to an agent of the action other than the subject of the imperative. Of 31 passive third person imperatives, 26 are in object transfers, three are in conditional constructs which include object transfers (Matt 10:13; 26:42; 1 Tim 5:9), one is in a conditional construct which requires the cooperation of another party (1 Cor 7:11b), and one in a subject transfer of an action (circumcision) normally performed by another party (1 Cor 7:18b).

153In one case, Rev 22:11, the pronoun is first person (v. 10), as the audience consists only of the writer himself (see discussion on this verse in Chapter III, pp. 43 - 44). In another rare case, 1 Cor 14:40, a vocative (αὐλελφόν, v. 39) with second person imperatives defines the responsible party; see also 2 Pet 3:8 (ἀγαπητοί). Occasionally, the responsible party is defined by a preceding third person imperative (Exod 9:9, see n. 115; Josh 6:8b, see n. 164).

154The passive in Eph 4:31 is appropriate; these sins are to be removed by those who possess them (see the contrast with γίνεσθαι in v. 32). See also John 14:27; 1 Cor 7:21; 16:14; Eph 4:29; 5:3; Heb 13:1; Jas 1:4; 4:9; 1 Pet 3:3; Gen 33:9.
imperative are used: Μή παρασζεσθω υμόν ή καρδια, πιστεύετε εἰς τὸν θεόν καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ πιστεύετε.\(^{155}\)

In some cases, the object emphasized is something outside of, but nevertheless under the control of, the audience.\(^{156}\) Paul, personifying sin as a master, directs his readers who have died to sin to reject its dominion: Μή σοιν βασιλεύετο ή ἀμαρτία εὐ τῷ θνητῷ υμῶν σώματι (Rom 6:12).\(^{157}\) Likewise, sunset, which represents when the party is to cease his or her anger, is emphasized in Eph 4:26; the reader is perceived to be in control of the anger, and therefore in control of when it is ceased.\(^{158}\) Paul commands that both ή εἰρήνη and λόγος τοῦ χριστοῦ are to be present (βραβευέται . . . ἐνοικείται) in his readers (Col 3:15 - 16).\(^{159}\) Some form of the expression υμῖν γνωστὸν ἔστω is found four times in Acts instructing the audience to receive certain information.\(^{160}\)

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\(^{155}\)The first verb πιστεύετε could be either imperative or indicative; the second is imperative. See also Acts 2:14; Phil 4:5 - 6; Jas 5:12 (Matt 5:37 with v. 34); Exod 16:29; 2 Chron 23:14; Ezek 20:19 - 20. In Sir 7:21 - 22 third person imperatives are contiguous with a second person prohibitive subjunctive and a second person prescriptive imperative.

\(^{156}\)This is often the case with the verbs εἰμί, γίνομαι, and γίνονσκο. In Josephus Ant. 4.200.1 the people are instructed outside Canaan: “There must be (ἐστὶ) a city in that place . . . which God shall choose.” However, it is obvious the people were responsible to make it happen, i.e., accept God’s selection and make it holy. Three additional object transfers follow, with ἐστὶ, concerning the building of the temple and altars, for which the people are also responsible (200.3; 201.2, 4). See also Gen 13:8; 21:12; 30:32 ; 2 Esd 7:21 - 24; Josephus Ant. 4.205, 292; Philo Ebr. 52.2.

\(^{157}\)Note the change from the second person plural imperative in v. 11 (ὡμές λογίζεσθε ἐκατοντοὺς) and back to the same in v. 13 (παριστάνετε . . . παριστήσατε). The third person object transfer allows the apostle to emphasize what is not to reign (sin), in contrast to who/what is to reign (vv. 14 - 22).

\(^{158}\)See Philo Spec. Leg. 3.152 from Deut 21:22 - 23. Philo’s quote is very loose. The future passive prohibition about the body remaining on the tree in Deuteronomy is changed to a third person present active imperative about not letting the sun set upon it. The future active command about burying (θάπτο) the body is changed to a third person present imperative of a more colorful verb (ἐπικρύπτο, “hide under the earth”). Thus, the third person imperative serves as a rhetorical device to enhance the language.

\(^{159}\)Boyer classifies this as “your permission that someone else do something,” presumably meaning the reader was to let Christ put his word in him (“A Classification of Imperatives,” 48). However, this treat the command as passive and neglects to consider Paul’s following imperatival participles in vv. 16b - 17 which effectively define how the believer is to carry out the injunction in v. 16a (cf. Eph 5:18 - 21). See also 1 John 2:24. The sense of permission could easily be expressed by ἐξέστο (“it must be allowed”), but it is not found in the Greek Bible, and rarely in the other sources examined. See Josephus Ant. 4.225: Ὀροὺς γῆς μὴ ἐξέστο κινεῖν μὴ ἐκεῖς (“It is not allowed to move a land boundary”); see Deut 19:14 which uses the second person future, οὐ μετακινεῖσείς ὁρία.

\(^{160}\)See Philo Spec. Leg. 3.152 from Deut 21:22 - 23. Philo’s quote is very loose. The future passive prohibition about the body remaining on the tree in Deuteronomy is changed to a third person present active imperative about not letting the sun set upon it. The future active command about burying (θάπτο) the body is changed to a third person present imperative of a more colorful verb (ἐπικρύπτο, “hide under the earth”). Thus, the third person imperative serves as a rhetorical device to enhance the language.
On six occasions in the New Testament the subjects of the third person imperatives are people who are the implied direct objects of commands to the audience. After Jesus healed the two blind men, he commanded them ‘Oráte μηδείς γνωσκέτω, (Matt 9:30). The third person slightly intensifies the command from the second person “See to it, tell no one!” to “See to it, no one is to know!” In Eph 5:6 Paul is not forbidding κενοίς λόγοις to those who might use them, so deceiving the church, but rather he is forbidding the church to allow itself to be deceived (Μηδείς ύμως ἀπατάτω).

An interesting example occurs in Luke 7:7 when the centurion says to Jesus εἰπὲ λόγῳ, καὶ ἰαθῆτω ὁ παῖς μου. In Matt 8:8 the third person passive imperative is changed to a third person future passive (ἰαθήσεται). Essentially, the centurion is making an implied conditional statement: “If you say the word, my servant will be healed.”

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161 Sir 9:14 - 16 is a good Septuagintal example. The subject of ἐστωσαν in v. 16 is parallel to the object of ἔστω in v. 15 and the parallel objects of the two second person imperatives in v. 14. Note also the fivefold repetition of σου.

In Gen 31:37 Jacob commands Laban to produce images which Laban had accused him of stealing and θες ὄντα ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀδελφῶν σου καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου, καὶ ἐλεγζάτωσαν ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν δύο ἡμῶν. The third person imperative was not a command directed at the relatives of each, but rather at Laban to allow the relatives to make the decision. Laban would subsequently direct the relatives to decide, but Jacob’s command contemplates Laban as the responsible party. Memphibosthos told King David concerning the land David had given to both him and Siba: τὰ πάντα λαβέτω (“Let him [Siba] receive it all,” Josephus Ant. 7.271). Obviously Siba is not responsible for the imperative, David is. This subtle distinction is sometimes missed by Glaze who includes this type of imperative among those which are addressed to an intermediary intended for a third party (“Septuagintal Use,” 12 - 13). For example, in Gen 30:15 Rachael commands Leah (not Jacob through Leah) to allow Jacob to lie with her. In Exod 5:5 - 9 Pharaoh commands taskmasters (not the Israelites through the taskmasters): Συνέταξε δὲ φαραώ τοῖς ἐργοδοτοῖς τοῦ λαοῦ (v. 6). He follows with a second person imperatival future (οὐκέτι προσεθήσεσθε) which is defined by the third person imperatives with the Israelites—objects of implied second person imperatives to the taskmasters—as subjects. In v. 9 the taskmasters’ responsibilities become clearer as two more object transfers: Βαρυνεθάνητο τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνήρων τούτων, καὶ μηρομάτωσαν τὰῦτα, καὶ μὴ μεριμνάτωσαν ἐν λόγοις κενοίς. This distinction is confusing when God is the speaker (Exod 11:2; 19:11 - 12, 24; Jer 9:16 - 17; 15:1; 1 Macc 7:7; etc.), and particularly when law is given with Moses as the intermediary (Exod 12:1 - 3; 21:1 - 2; 25:1ff; Deut 20:3; etc.). However, in the case of the Law, the “implied” audience is the people for whom Moses acts as an intermediary (see n. 117).

There are uncommon object transfers in the Septuagint where the subject of the third person imperative is directly addressed (Gen 27:31, καὶ ἐπε τῷ πατρὶ, ἀναστήτῳ ὁ πατὴρ μου, καὶ φαγέτω, as if Esau were requesting his father to direct himself to arise and eat, see also Num 20:23 - 24) and the subject of the third person imperative is the speaker himself (Gen 44:18, Ἰσούδας ἐίπε, δέομαι, κύρε, λαλήσατω ὁ παῖς σου ἰημα ἐναντίον σου). Nevertheless, the subjects can be viewed as objects of implied second person imperatives to the ones addressed. Both imperatives have only an optative force (see Chapter III for the force of imperatives).

162 See also 1 John 3:7; Col 2:16, 18; Isa 36:14 - 15, 18. If the perpetrators were among the readers, these could be understood as subject transfers as far as the perpetrators were concerned. However, the thrust in each of these passages is toward those who might be deceived, judged, etc. The indeterminates μηδείς and τις, as used in these passages, are set in direct contrast to the listening audience (ὑμᾶς). In Rom 14:16 an indeterminate subject is understood in the passive βλασφημεῖσθο. 

163 The use of imperatives in Luke’s passage raises various questions of interpretive value; see n. 103.
There are 25 occurrences of third person imperative object transfers in the New Testament in which those responsible for carrying out the action cannot be determined by syntactical constructs. The immediate or extended context must otherwise imply who the responsible party or parties are. However, the implications are not always clear.\textsuperscript{164}

Third person imperatives are frequently used in the Septuagint for capital crimes.\textsuperscript{165} For obvious reasons, the subject of the imperative could not be expected to execute it. In various ways, the congregation of Israel itself was the responsible party to carry out the imperative (Lev 24:16). In the New Testament, there are only two parallel references to capital punishment using a third person imperative (Matt 15:4; Mark 7:10). Jesus quotes Exod 21:16, which he cites against his Jewish antagonists, having no thought of anyone carrying out the command.\textsuperscript{166} In the original context, it is difficult to determine who, if anyone, would actually put the rebellious child to death.\textsuperscript{167}

With a verb of similar nature, there is little doubt who the speakers intended to have execute their command: Σταυρωθήτω . . . Σταυρωθήτω (Matt 27:22 - 23). Pilate specifically asked the crowd what he was to do with Jesus (Τί οὖν ποιήσω Ἰησοῦν). The parallels reflect this clearly by using second person singular imperatives (Mark 15:13 - 14; Luke 23:21; John 19:6).

Variations of the theme κατά τὴν πίστιν υμῶν γενηθήτω υμῖν occur three times in Matthew (8:13; 9:29; 15:28). The subjects of the imperatives are healings, the objects of Jesus’ actions in response to requests of faith. In this case, the speaker views himself as the party responsible to execute the imperative (see also Gen 37:27). Although these might be construed as a form of blessing, blessings in the traditional sense do not occur with the third person imperative in the New Testament.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{164}Thus, this group alone is determined by pragmatic rather than syntactical considerations, but is included in this chapter for the sake of completeness. In Josh 6:5 - 10 there is a series of seven third person imperatives. Four of these are determinate subject transfers (see above n. 127). The remaining three shift the emphasis to different objects: ἐπὶ τὰ σάλπιγγας were to sound (σημαινέτωσαν, v. 8b; the subject of the imperative is less likely ἐπὶ τερεσίς), ἢ κυρίως τὴς διαψίδης was to follow (ἐπικουλουθεῖτο, v. 8c), and no one was to hear the voice of the people—Μὴ βοάτε, μηδὲ ἄκουσάτο μηδὲς τὴν φωνήν υμῶν (v. 10). The responsible parties for the sounding of the seven trumpets were clearly the “seven priests having seven sacred trumpets” (defined by παρελθέτωσαν; see n. 153), and the responsible parties for not allowing anyone to hear were the people: Τῷ δὲ λαῷ ἐνετείλατο Ἰησοῦς λέγον, μὴ βοάτε, μηδὲ ἄκουσάτο μηδὲς τὴν φωνήν ὑμῶν. However, the responsible party for ἐπικουλουθεῖτο (v. 8c) is not determined by second person constructs in the immediate context, but can only be determined by implication from the immediate or extended context. In this case, those responsible for carrying the ark of the covenant are the priests (vv. 12 - 14 with Josh 3 and 4). For additional examples in the Septuagint see Gen 34:21; 2 Kings 14:24; 2 Esd 6:3, 5, 7 - 9; Song of Sol 4:16a; in Josephus see Ant. 4.200 - 202, 205, 219, et. al.

\textsuperscript{165}See Exod 21:12, 15, 17; 35:2; Lev 20:9 - 15, 27; 24:16 - 17, 21; Num 15:35; 35:16 - 18, 21. They are used in conjunction with both second person imperatives and imperatival future indicatives. In many cases they are in conditional constructs which normally contain subject transfers, but the nature of this imperative demands it be an object transfer. See “Conditional Constructs.”

\textsuperscript{166}Jesus agrees with Codex Alexandrinus against the accepted text that has the future τελευτήσει. Philo Fug. 83 also uses τελευτάτω, as well as in the preceding verse which has θανατούσθω in the Septuagint. See also Philo Jos. 217 for τελευτάτω.


The modern common expression “The Lord’s will be done” is not so common in the Bible; it is found only in Acts 21:14. The subject of the third person imperative (γινέσθω) is the will of the Lord. It is the desire of the speaker that both the disciples and Paul do whatever God wills in the controversy over the apostle’s forthcoming trip to Jerusalem.

There are six object transfers in the Pauline epistles where the responsible party must be inferred from the context. Paul writes to Titus: μαθανέτωσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καλῶν ἔργον προίστασθαι . . . (3:14). This is an injunction directed at Titus to “Teach our own [people] to be concerned about good works . . .” If their own people read the directive to the evangelist, as modern readers do, they would understand the imperative as binding on them. This is well illustrated in Josephus: διδάξετε αὐτὰ τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν (Deut 11:19).

In Paul’s first letter to Timothy two object transfers enjoin what is the responsibility of the whole church: καὶ οὗτοι (i.e., διακόνους, 3:8) δὲ δοκιμαζέσθωσαν πρῶτον (3:10a), and οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαν (5:17). The responsibility is narrower in v. 16. The believing woman who has widowed relatives is not to burden the church with their care.

The direct objects of the four verbs ἔχει constitute the plural subject of the singular third person imperative in 1 Cor 14:26: πάντα πρὸς οἰκοδομήν γινέσθω. This injunction serves as a summary introduction (explicated by nine third person imperatives in vv. 27 - 30, 34 - 35), and forms an inclusio with the summary conclusion in v. 40: πάντα (same object transfers as in v. 26) δὲ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω. Verse 39 demonstrates that the responsible parties are the saints in the reading audience (ἀδελφοί, followed by two second person imperatives), which is implied in v. 26 (ἀδελφοί).

Perhaps one third person imperative in the New Testament is an axiom: γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθῆς, πάς δὲ ἀνθρωπος ψεύστης (Rom 3:4). The apostle is not calling upon anyone to prove God true and every person a liar. The context demonstrates

169 Other than in direct address to God (see discussion on prayer below).
170 In this secondary sense, the imperative could be understood as a subject transfer, but contextually Titus is the responsible party. Note the second person singular imperatives σπουδάσον (v. 12), πρότειμον (v. 13), and ἀσπάσατε (v. 15).
171 Tim 3:10b is a determinate subject transfer with the same antecedent. Note the change from active to passive voice.
172 For similar use of the passive ἀξιούσθωσαν see Philo Spec. Leg. 2.78; Vit. Mos. 2.208. For the same sense, but the active phrase ἔστωσαν . . . ἐν ἀπάσῃ τιμῇ, see Josephus Ant. 4.2:215.
173 Verse 16a is an indefinite first class condition. Ἀρείσθος in 16b is not formally part of the apodosis of 16a, rather it is possibly the apodosis of an elliptical protasis based on the preceding condition: “If such is the case, . . .” or more specifically, “If the church has widows assisted by believing women, . . .” Each imperative must be considered separately. However, formally considered, a sentence cannot be conditional without a protasis. Therefore, this is an object transfer. The emphasis shifts from the female believer’s responsibility to the widow to her responsibility to the church: “Assist the widow, do not burden the church.” By making the church the subject of the third person imperative, emphasis is put on what the woman is not to do.
174 See the discussion on 1 Cor 14:27 - 28 in Chapter III, pp. 50 - 51.
that the truth of the statement is verified by the unrighteousness of humanity. C. E. B. Cranfield states, “The use of the imperative is a vigorous way of stating the true situation after the emphatic rejection of an altogether false suggestion.”

A special sub-category of object transfers is prayer. The force of the imperative in prayer is generally understood as optative, with God presupposed as the party responsible to carry out the request. Of 13 third person imperatives in prayers in the New Testament, it is the case that five follow this general understanding. In Matt 26:39 Jesus prays: Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατὸν ἔστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τούτο. Jesus wants his Father to free him from the coming passion.

The remaining four imperatives with an optative sense are taken from Old Testament quotes (Acts 1:20a, b; Rom 11:9 - 10). Both Peter and Paul draw analogies from the same imprecatory Psalm (68:23 - 24, 26) requesting that God judge his enemies. The apostles proclaim that this has been accomplished, in contemporary terms, as consequences of Judas and Israel’s actions respectively.

The majority of third person imperatives in New Testament prayer contexts (8) have an obligatory force; the third person imperative with an object transfer expresses what the petitioner perceives must be carried out by himself and/or others. Jesus’ instructive prayers in Matt 6:9 - 10 and Luke 11:2 are essentially second person imperatives: “sanctify God’s name” (see Isa 8:13), “do God’s will” (likely a parallelism with “his kingdom come”). Those in Jesus’ audience would naturally understand themselves as subject to these injunctions.

There does not seem to be any sense of the speaker requesting that God allow (“let”) these things to occur, or that God make them happen.

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176 Two object transfers in prayers (Matt 26:39, 42) are apodoses in conditional constructs. However, for the sake of completeness, they are discussed under this classification.
177 I discuss the force of third person imperatives in general in Chapter III. However, it is necessary when considering prayer to discuss the force of the imperative in order to determine the responsible party (“true subject”), who, I do not believe, is always God. When second person imperatives are used in prayer in the New Testament, the force is always optative (or, possibly hortative in rare cases; see John 12:28; 17:1, 5).
178 Some MSS have variants in Luke 11:2 which also carry an optative force: ἐλθέτω τὸ πνεῦμά σου τὸ ἄγιον ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ καθαρισθῶ ἡμᾶς.
179 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the nature of God’s role in these or similar events, or the manner in which New Testament exegetes used Old Testament passages. For the Psalmist, the enemies would be his own; for Peter and Paul, the enemies would be those of Christ. See F. F. Bruce, The Acts of the Apostles (3d rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990): 110, and James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9 - 16 (WBC 38B; Dallas: Word, Incorporated, 1988): 649 - 650.
180 Robert A. Guelich rightly notes that the three petitions of Matt 6:9 - 10 are integrally related and that an obligation for compliance falls upon every disciple. However, as is common with many interpretations influenced by theological issues, Guelich puts most of the emphasis on the eschatological actualization of the requests (Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding [Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1982]: 289 -290, 310 - 311). Joseph Fitzmyer goes even further in an eschatological understanding by eliminating the disciple’s role entirely: “Neither of them [the two wishes of Luke 11:2] expresses something that human beings can or are expected to bring about” (The Gospel According to Luke, X - XXIV [AB 28A; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1985]: 898). Both authors employ the so-called “punctiliar” or “once for all... point in time” nature of the aorist imperatives to support the eschatological interpretation. Against this use of the tenses, see Chapter IV.
occur;\textsuperscript{181} it is understood that they are to occur.\textsuperscript{182} To classify them in the traditional sense of having an optative force (the speaker wishes they would happen) softens the intention of Jesus’ instruction to his disciples and his own words in the garden, which are specific applications of these earlier injunctions (Matt 26:42; Luke 22:42).\textsuperscript{183} The remainder of the imperatives in these prayers (Matt 6:11 - 13; Luke 11:3 - 4) does not have an obligatory sense, but rather an optative sense seeking fulfillment from God.\textsuperscript{184}

Peter in Acts 1:20c quotes from a prayer which carries only an optative force τήν ἐπισκοπήν αὔτοῦ λαβέτω ἔτερος (Ps 108:8, Septuagint). The apostle, however, understands the fulfillment to be an obligation upon himself and those with him (vv. 21 - 26). Although the imperative in prayers often has an optative force, it is noteworthy that Peter changes the form of the Psalm from an optative (λάβοι) to the third person imperative. K. L. McKay points out that by making this shift, Peter “was applying it more directly to a situation which he saw as requiring action which could readily be taken, than the Psalmist’s wish for God to act and proposal for desirable possibilities.”\textsuperscript{185}

In the preceding eight cases, an imperatival transfer takes place from responsibility falling upon the addressee to others, which includes the speakers themselves. The third person allows the obligatory sense to be maintained without it appearing as if God were obliged. This class could be called reflexive object transfer; it implies the responsibility for fulfillment falls back on the speaker, and perhaps others among whom he is included.\textsuperscript{186}

I located 164 (including some variants) third person imperatives in prayer contexts in the Septuagint, most of which (ca. 75 percent) have an optative force expressing a desire or seeking permission. However, many of the remainder might be considered obligatory, with a reflexive sense. The Psalmist cries to God, πληρωθῶ τὸ στόμα μου αἰνέσεως ὑπὸ υμνήσω τὴν δόξαν σου (70:8); he surely is not asking permission or expressing something he simply desires to do; he sees it as his

\textsuperscript{181}Although this view is not untenable in light of Ezek 36:22 - 27, which may also provide the background for the variants in Luke 11:2.

\textsuperscript{182}Porter cites Matt 6:9 (with Rom 3:4) in his argument that the imperative mood is not time-based. He says the imperative here expresses “an assumption, and has no necessary relation to a future world” (Verbal Aspect, 168). Although my analysis does suggest the imperative in Matt 6:9 has reference to a future time, if I understand Porter correctly, both he and I are viewing this prayer imperative as a reality that is at least to be recognized; it is not contingent upon obedience, nevertheless, it demands a response. The same cannot be said of Rom 3:4. Paul is not calling upon his readers, or anyone, to prove God true, which all do by unrighteousness; he is calling upon them to recognize God is true.

\textsuperscript{183}It is arguable, in Luke 22, that Jesus is simply exhorting his Father to proceed with the judgment, particularly in light of the second person imperative (παρένεγκε). In the Matthean version however, Jesus clearly demonstrates that the choice to proceed is his, ἔξω μὴ φυτῆ πλεύσας, which is in accord with the extended context that sets in conflict Jesus’ will with the Father’s, and the reality that Jesus laid down his life voluntarily (John 10:17 - 18). In John 12:28 Jesus uses a second person aorist imperative in prayer—“Father, glorify your name.” However, in that context, Jesus is calling upon God not to save him from the cross (12:27); the force may be hortative.

\textsuperscript{184}W. F. Bakker, as most, overlooks this distinction in the imperatives of the Lord’s Prayer (The Greek Imperative [Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1966]: 132 - 133).


\textsuperscript{186}This use of the third person imperative is clearly seen in Gen 1:3 - 26. Object transfers are repeatedly used in the creation account (“Let there be light, etc.”) to reflect the responsibility back on the speaker himself.
obligation. Raguel, praising God in prayer, declares, εὐλογεῖτοσάν σε οἱ ἅγιοι σου, καὶ πάσαι αἱ κτίσει σου, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄγγελοι σου, καὶ οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ σου, εὐλογεῖτοσάν σε εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας (Tob 8:15). Trustworthiness (ἐμπιστευθήτωσαν) of the prophets (among whom Sirach likely considers himself, 51:23) is the responsibility of the prophets themselves (Sir 36:15).

Conditional Constructs

The remaining third person imperatives (54) are classified, with respect to syntactical categories, as conditional constructs. The third person imperative is in the apodosis of either a first or third class conditional sentence. In all but 14 cases, the imperative is effectively an emphatic subject transfer, and therefore the responsible party for carrying out the imperative is the one who meets the condition in the protasis. As with subject transfers above, in nearly every case the responsible party is either in the immediate audience or in the “implied” audience. In the 14 object transfer cases the responsible party is the listening/reading audience determined by either a second person form in the immediate context (Matt 10:13; 18:17; 26:39; Acts 4:10) or contextual implication (1 Cor 7:15; 11:6; 16:22; Gal 1:8 - 9; 2 Thess 3:10; 1 Tim 5:4). In one case involving prayer (Matt 26:42), the sense is reflexive. Three different conditional constructs can be identified: indefinite, specified, and mixed.

The majority of cases (31) are indefinite conditions. In an indefinite condition the subject—which is necessarily always singular—of the third person imperative in the apodosis is the referent of an indefinite singular pronoun subject (πτέρος) in the protasis.

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187 See also Pss 17:47; 47:10 - 12; 66:1 - 8; 137:4 - 5.
188 See also Tobit’s praise in 8:5. In 3:11 an optative is used with the same sense; the petitioner desires that the creation praise God. See also 1 Chron 17:23 - 24; Jdt 16:14; 1 Macc 4:33.
189 Classifications are determined by mood forms in the protasis, see Robertson, Grammar, 1004 - 1022. In a more complex approach, Smyth classifies conditional statements by function based on temporal considerations (Grammar, 512 - 537). McKay classifies them on the degree of certainty in the protasis (Syntax, 294 - 320). Porter modifies the traditional classifications of mood form in the protasis (Verbal Aspect, 294 - 320). It appears the “class” of the condition is not germane to the nature of this study. It is interesting that the only third class indefinite conditions are in John (7:37; 12:26), and these are the only conditions in John with a third person imperative in the apodosis. However, I noticed no other discernible patterns. There are 41 third person imperatives in 33 “first class” conditions, and 13 third person imperatives in ten “third class” conditions.
190 Acts 19:38 is stated as if the subject were not in the audience possibly because the speaker was uncertain. The imperatives in 1 Tim 5:4, 9, 16b presumably were to be communicated by Timothy as an intermediary. The two conditional statements in Matt 27:43 and Luke 23:35 are said by the mocking crowds knowing the responsible parties were present.
191 See above pp. 33 - 34.
192 There are ample examples of each type in Josephus and Philo (especially in legal material), including some from other “classes” of conditions. See for example Philo Spec. Leg. 2.36 - 38; 3.69 - 71 where each type is represented including some in fourth class conditions that do not occur in the New Testament. In my limited examination of legal material in Philo, the preponderance of conditions were third class.
193 For examples in Josephus see Ant. 4.246, 274; 10.281; Bell. 4.372; in Philo see Spec. Leg. 2.36; 3.69, 86, 134, 173, 184; 4.22 - 25; Plant. 8; Jos. 216; Cher. 19.
194 Other third person mood forms are also used where a third person imperative might be appropriate. For example, first class conditions also use the future indicative (Mark 9:35; 1 Cor 3:12 - 15,
The pronoun tends to universalize the condition beyond, but never exclusive of, the immediate listening or reading audience. In a few cases, the intended audience is grammatically, but not practically, limited by a personal pronoun. For example, in Jas 1:5 - 6 the protasis has the phrase τις ὕμων λέιπεται with αὐτείπτω two times in the apodosis. The address is to “anyone” in James’ immediate audience (ὕμων), and though a second person imperative might seem appropriate (“ask God”), number and person agreement is retained with the third person imperative. Pronouns which appear to narrow the scope of τις in conditional sentences occur only here and in 1 Cor 3:18b; 2 Thess 3:10; 1 Pet 4:16. In pragmatic terms however, these indefinite conditions have the same scope as those without qualifying pronouns.

The examples of indefinite subjects in third person imperatives are fairly straightforward. Typical is Matt 16:24 (and the parallels Mark 8:34; Luke 9:23). Jesus said to his disciples, Εἶ τις θέλει ὁ πόσιος μου ἐλθεῖν, ἀπαρνησάσθω ἕως ὅταν καὶ ἀνέπτω τὸν σταυρόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτο μοι. The indefinite pronoun refers to “anyone” who desires to be Jesus’ disciple, whether in the immediate audience or not. The third person imperatives enjoin what is required of “anyone” with such a desire.

Likewise, Paul addresses a specific occasion about marital problems in the Corinthian church with an indefinite condition which has a universal application: Εἶ τις ἀδελφός γυναικὸς ἔχει ἄπιστον καὶ οὕτη συνυποκειται οἰκείαν μετ’ αὐτοῦ. μη ἀφιέτω οὗτήν (1 Cor 7:12 with v. 13). In both of these cases, the third person imperative is a subject transfer.

17; Rev 14:9 - 10), present indicative (Rom 8:9; 13:9; 1 Cor 14:38; Gal 6:3; 1 Tim 3:1; 5; 5:8; Rev 13:10a; 14:11), aorist indicative (1 Cor 8:2; Rev 20:15), perfect indicative (1 Cor 8:3; 2 Cor 2:5; 1 Tim 5:8; 6:3 - 4; Jas 1:23), and occasionally an aorist infinitive (Rev 11:5b; 13:10b). In some cases the verb is elided in the apodosis (2 Cor 5:17; Jas 1:26; 3:2; 1 Pet 4:11).

195 These are generally viewed as having the same effect as second person imperatives because the immediate audience is logically included in τις; see for example Boyer, “A Classification of Imperatives,” 47. Glaze has a “true” third person imperative that is addressed to a third person either with or without an intermediary (“Septuagintal Use,” 12 - 17). Probably because of the paucity of indefinite conditions with third person imperatives in the apodosis in the Septuagint (one first class, 1 Esd 2:3; six third class, Exod 21:12, 17 [with ὃς ἐκεῖν] 20; Lev 20:2, 11 - 12), Glaze does not address this category specifically. Indefinite conditions might be included in the true third person category without an intermediary, which sometimes presents an “ideal participant” when “the real intent of the discussion is to produce a desired response in the hearer” (Ibid., 16). However, Glaze’s suggestion that this use of the third person tends to “soften the tone” or make a command “more polite . . . a more diplomatic way of producing a desired response in the hearer” (15 - 16), would not be true for indefinite conditions. On the contrary, the third person is necessitated (grammatically) to carry the obligatory force of the injunction. Any attempt to mollify the imperative force of the apodosis in an indefinite condition would be self-defeating (see the examples above). The only indefinite condition that might carry less than an obligatory force in the New Testament is John 7:37. Here the force seems to be hortative, yet Jesus could be understood to say, “If anyone is thirsty, he must come to me,” granting that anyone who is thirsty logically wants the thirst quenched.

196 In 1 Pet 4:16 the verb and indefinite subject are elided in the protasis, but inferred from v. 15: μὴ γάρ τις ὕμων πασχέτω ὃς . . . The parallels are essentially identical. The only variation is Luke’s use of ἀρνησάσθω for ἀπαρνησάσθο (which is witnessed in some Lukan MSS). The difference is insignificant. John 12:26 is similar, but uses a third class condition.

197 That conditional constructs have essentially the same effect as emphatic subject transfers is demonstrated by Mark 4:23 and Rev 13:9 which formulate the idiom ὅ ἐχον ὡτα ἀκούειν ἀκούετω as conditions: Εἶ τις ἔχει ὡτα ἀκούειν ἀκούετω. See p. 25 above.
As mentioned above, a few conditional constructs have third person object transfers. In such cases, the apodosis may also set forth a consequence: εἰ τις οὖ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι, μηδε ἐσθετέω (2 Thess 3:10). Paul is directing the church not to feed (support) anyone who refuses to work.

Included among object transfers are curses: εἰ τις οὖ φιλεῖ τὸν κύριον, ἢτω ἀνάθεμα (1 Cor 16:22); ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ἦ= ἀγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ εὐγγέλιζοντας ὑμῖν παρ᾽ ὁ εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῖν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω...εἰ τις ὑμᾶς εὐγγέλιζοντας παρ᾽ ὁ περελάβετε, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω (Gal 1:8 - 9). The subjects of these imperatives are those who meet the conditions of the protases. They cannot be expected to carry out the curse on themselves; the imperatives represent the consequences of their actions. However, these are probably not examples of imperatives in imprecations taking the place of the optative common in classical Greek. The force of the apodoses in these curses is certain, not only possible, if the protases are fulfilled. Paul is stating what will be, not what he hopes will be: “Paul is here not expressing a wish but a verdict.” McKay suggests “Paul is appealing to his flock to pay no attention to certain people (to treat them as accursed) rather than praying for God’s curse on them.” In other words, these “curses” are not imprecatory prayers, but commands to the readers to treat such people as outside God’s grace. Lenski is correct to emphasize that neither Paul nor his readers could render the verdict themselves: “Anyone who promulgates a different and contrary gospel is eo ipso ‘accursed,’ not because we say so, but because Christ has said so, and we only repeat his judgment.”

The second category of conditional constructs is specified conditions (16). In a specified condition the subject—which can be either singular or plural—of the third person imperative in the apodosis is the referent of the subject of the protasis, which is clearly defined (specified) and tends to, thereby, restrict the audience. In two conditional constructs with inverted elements, the mocking crowds at the cross cry out ὅσα μόνον εἰ θέλει αὐτόν (the antecedent for the subject is θεόν) (Matt 27:43) and σωσάτω ἑαυτον, εἰ οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ χριστός τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ ἐκλεκτός (Luke 23:35). Each imperative is fronted for emphasis.

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199 Gal 1:8 has a specified rather than indefinite subject; see the following group of conditional constructs. Gal 1:8 is also the only occurrence of an apodosis with a third person imperative having a protasis introduced by καὶ ἐὰν (or καὶ εἰ), which Burton calls “concessive” and “highly improbable” (Moods and Tenses, 112 - 116). See also Robertson, Grammar, 1026-1027; James L. Boyer, “Other Conditional Elements in New Testament Greek,” Grace Theological Journal 4/2 (1988): 186 - 188. Gal 1:8 - 9 offer a good comparison between two types of real conditions. In v. 8 Paul uses the subjunctive with καὶ εἰ (“even if”) concerning himself and angels suggesting the improbable, in v. 9 he uses the indefinite pronoun with the indicative suggesting what may actually be the case in the Galatian churches. See Young, Intermediate, 228.


202 Syntax, 85.

203 Galatians, 41.

204 For examples from Josephus see Ant. 4.223 - 224 (fourth class conditions), 259; and from Philo see Spec. Leg. 2.37 - 38 (three fourth class conditions, the last with an elided verb); 3.70 - 71.

205 See also Philo Deus. Imm. 64.
Referring to the unmarried men (ἄγαμοις) and widows (χήραις) in the preceding verse, Paul states, εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται, γαμησάτωσαν (1 Cor 7:9). However, to those already married (γεγαμήκοσιν), he commands the wife, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ χορισθῇ, μενετῶ ἄγαμος η= τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλαγήτω, and so also the husband (v. 11). The audiences are specified by the protases, and therefore restricted to those who meet the conditions.

Object transfers also occur in specified conditions. An excellent example is in Matt 18:17. In the immediate context (18:15-17), there are five third class conditions. The subject in the protasis of each is the brother who sins. The subject of the first four apodoses is the audience, addressed by four second person singular imperatives and one second person singular indicative. In the fifth apodosis, the expected object (the sinful brother) becomes the subject (through the third person imperative), the expected subject (the second person singular) becomes the indirect object (σοι). In the first four conditions Jesus’ emphasis is on the actions of the audience, instructing them to implement discipline upon the sinful brother. If this process fails, the emphasis shifts to the consequences of the sinful brother’s refusal to listen: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας παρακούσῃ, ἔστω σοι ὡσπέρ ὁ ἐθνικὸς καὶ ὁ τελῶνης. This emphasis would have been lost had Jesus followed with another second person imperative: “Treat him as a . . .”

The third person imperative in 1 Cor 7:15 is also an object transfer: εἰ δὲ ὁ ἀπιστος χωρίζεται, χωρίζεσθω. The subject of the imperative is the unbeliever who divorces, but the injunction is for the believer who is being divorced. Taken with vv. 15b - 16 it seems clear the apostle is not obligating the believer to divorce, but only suggesting it as the prudent course, or granting permission. This is a practical exhortation (hortative force); the believer may not be able to do anything about the divorce the unbeliever pursues. Thus, Paul’s exhortation must go beyond a recognition of the fact of the divorce; that would only be stating the obvious. His words must recognize the divorce as legitimate, thereby freeing the believer from the covenant obligations to which he or she would otherwise be bound (7:10 - 11 with Matt 19:1 - 9)—thus, οὐ δεδούλωται.

The remaining conditional constructs (7), could be viewed as a sub-category of specified conditions, but I have separated them because there is a change of subject between the protasis and the apodosis. Accordingly, I have named them mixed conditions. In a mixed condition the subject—singular or plural—of the third person imperative in the apodosis differs from the subject of the protasis; the new subject is introduced from the context and (as in specified conditions) it tends to restrict the condition. Two are subject transfers. Festus told the Jews accusing Paul, εἰ τί ἔστιν

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206 See the references to Matt 26:39, 42 on pp. 33 - 34. See Josephus Ant. 4.279 - 282 for object transfers including a perfect tense imperative (πεθάνατο) in the apodosis.


208 An excellent, though complex, example of this type occurs in Josephus Ant. 4.282 which includes several of the elements discussed in this chapter: ἐὰν δὲ δοῦλον ἢ θεράπαιναν ἀποκείμην βοῦς, αὐτὸς μὲν καταλθοῦσθαι, τριάκοντα δὲ σκλοὺς ὁ κύριος τοῦ βοῦς ἀποτίνει τῷ δεσπότῃ τοῦ ἀνήρμενον (the first subject in this compound apodosis [καταλθοῦσθαι] is an object transfer [βοῦς], the second [ἀποτίνει] is a subject transfer [ὁ κύριος]). βοῦς δὲ ἐὰν οὕτως πληγεῖς ἀποθάνῃ, πωλεῖσθωσαν καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ ὁ πλήξας καὶ τὴν τιμὴν τὴν ἁμοφότερον οἱ
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έν τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἄτοπον κατηγορεῖτοσαν (i.e., οἱ δυνατοί) αὐτοῦ (Acts 25:5). The leaders of the Jews, who were among those listening, are singled out for emphasis. Also, in 1 Cor 14:30 Paul instructed prophets in the assembly concerning the delivery of prophecy: ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλω ἀποκαλυφθῇ καθημένῳ, ὁ πρῶτος σιγάτω. The one speaking when another received a revelation was to cease speaking and let the prophet with the new revelation speak.

The remaining five mixed conditions are object transfers. Jesus instructed the twelve about to embark upon a mission journey to let their peace rest only on those houses that were worthy (Matt 10:13). In 1 Cor 11:6b the apostle said εἰ δὲ αἵματον γυναικὶ τὸ κείρασθαι η = ξυφάσθαι, κατακαλυπτέσθαι. As in the preceding specified condition (v. 6a), the woman is the subject of the third person imperative. The party responsible to carry out the injunction is the church; they are not to exclude a woman whose head has been shaved.

Finally, 1 Tim 5:4 is the only example in the New Testament where τις occurs in the protasis with a subject shift in the apodosis. The objects in the protasis (τέκνα η = ἐχίνων) become the subjects of the apodosis, as well as the implied subjects of the first class conditions in vv. 8 and 16. The primary theme of this section is caring for needy widows, first by family members (vv. 4, 8, 16a), and absent of family members, by the church (v. 16b). Secondarily, the “enrollment” of widows (vv. 9 - 15) is a separate, yet
related issue. Verse 4 makes a shift in emphasis from the responsibility of qualifying widows to those responsible for their care. The first class condition in vv. 9-10 contains a third person imperative with the widow as the subject, but the directive is toward the church. With this use of the third person imperative, the stress throughout is upon those caring for needy widows.

In the four sources examined (New Testament, Septuagint, Philo, and Josephus), every third person imperative fell into one of the three syntactical/semantic categories identified: emphatic subject transfers, emphatic object transfers, and conditional constructs. Once the categories were inductively identified, there was little difficulty classifying each third person imperative. I have attempted to use terminology that best describes what is taking place with regard to the subject of the third person imperative.

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215 The only second person imperatives in this section (vv. 3, 7, 11) are also addressed to the church, and two imperatival infinitives are addressed to the children/grandchildren (v. 4). Only four of the less forceful imperatival infinitives are addressed to widows (v. 14). Thus, the tone of the section is set by the imperatival forms, emphasizing care for widows, who are really widows (ὀντως χηρος). Voelz may be correct when he states (concerning v. 9) that this passage “may require considerable adjustment for modern times” (“Use of Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 21).
CHAPTER III
PRAGMATIC CATEGORIES
OF THE THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the third person imperative with respect to authorial intent and context. The attempt is to go beyond semantic and/or syntactical categories in search of “meaning.” This is a formidable task and must be limited by its very nature. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is nearly impossible to isolate the syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic tasks. For example, when determining the “true” subject (responsible party) of third person imperative in the object transfer class, the context must provide the answer. Even in the case of a subject transfer, the concept of “transfer” is drawn from the context. Perhaps only indefinite and specified conditional constructs with subject transfers in the apodoses are determined by purely syntactical and semantic factors.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with every New Testament third person imperative in pragmatic terms. I have chosen to deal with two general areas of concern in summary form: the levels of “force” or imperatival intensity and the contextual party(ies) responsible to carry out the imperative. Following this, new insights are given to two case studies (Acts 2:38 and 1 Cor 14:27 - 28), in light of what this thesis has revealed concerning the use of third person imperatives.

Levels of Force

There is universal recognition that imperatives function on different levels of intensity and only the context determines the force or stress they carry. Sometimes when the third person imperative is discussed in relation to the second person, other issues concerning intensity are raised, but generally it is recognized that the force of the third person imperative is at least equal to that of the second person: “The third person Greek imperative is as strongly directive as the second person.” This is manifestly demonstrated in legal or legislative material where the third person imperative is a common occurrence. It is arguable, especially in some cases of subject transfers (above pp. 22 - 27), that the third person increases the intensity over the second person because it narrows the focus of the command to each individual in the audience.

Although the classification of some cases is somewhat subjective and open to debate, I have identified essentially three general levels of imperatival intensity among

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216 See above p. 18.
217 I have reserved the discussion on tense usage, which is not peculiar to the third person imperative, for Chapter IV.
218 Every grammar consulted agrees; for example, see Moulton, Grammar, 172 - 173; Robertson, Grammar, 946 - 949.
219 For example, see the discussion on prohibitive imperatives above, pp. 11 - 12.
220 Porter, Idioms, 55.
221 As in all four sources used for this thesis. J. E. Harry points out that Plato “uses more imperatives in the third person than all the other prose writers combined (hundreds in the Laws alone)” (“The Perfect Subjunctive, Optative, and Imperative in Greek,” Classical Review 17 [1903]: 353).
222 For example, in Ephesians 5 the shift from ἄγαπάτε (v. 25) to ἄγαπάτω (v. 33).
third person imperatives: obligatory, hortative, and optative. The majority (197) have an obligatory force, i.e., the imperative has full imperatival intensity obligating the responsible party(ies) to act in a particular manner. In most cases this sense is obvious: Μὴ ὁμαλῶς ἡ ἁμαρτία εἶναι τῷ θυμῷ ὑμῶν σώματι (Rom 6:12); Εἴ τις θέλει ὁπίσω μου ἔλθειν, ἀπαρνησίσθω ἑαυτόν καὶ ἀράτῳ τὸν σταυρόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτο μοι (Matt 16:24). Considering the consequences of not doing what is commanded in these passages, it is difficult to imagine Paul and Jesus only exhorting (hortative level) their audiences.

However, the sense is not always so obvious. When Jesus told the blind men concerning their healings, κατὰ τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν γενηθήτω ὑμῖν (Matt 9:29 cf. 8:13; 15:28), he was essentially saying, “It must be done for you because of your faith.” He was obligating himself to so respond according to their faith. In each case where the speaker views himself as the party responsible to carry out the action of the imperative (i.e., the imperative is “reflexive”), the force is obligatory. Such is true in some cases of prayer (Matt 6:9-10; 26:42; Luke 11:2; 22:42; Acts 1:20c).

Forms of the expression ὑμῖν γνωστὸν ἐστω (Acts 2:14; 4:10; 13:38; 28:28) are sometimes understood as “an exhortation or strong wish.” However semantically and syntactically the force must be stronger. In each case the audience is instructed to know something which is immediately revealed to them; they have no choice but to know it. Note also in Acts 2:14 Peter follows the third person imperative with a second person imperative (ἐνεργεῖτε τὰ ῥήματά μου). Peter does not appear to be expressing a

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223 Glaze also identifies “three levels of imperatival intensity: (1) direct imperative, (2) subjunctive, and (3) wishes” (“Septuagintal Use,” 24-25). However, it is unclear why she reserved this discussion for the third person imperative functioning as a second person. Are there not levels of intensity when it functions as a “true third person” (see her Chapter II)? In addition, at times she appears to confuse “imperatival intensity” with grammatical and descriptive considerations. For example, it is not the case that each “emphasis transformation” (what I have called “emphatic object transfer,” pp. 27-35) functions on the strongest level of intensity (Ibid., 25-27). Indeed, the majority of emphasis transformations that occur in prayer contexts function only on an optative (Glaze’s “wish”) level (Num 10:34; Josh 10:12; Ps 16:2, a third person imperative object transfer is in parallel with a third person optative object transfer; see the juxtaposition of imperatives and optatives in Pss 34; 68; etc.). Glaze discusses various descriptive categories under “direct imperative” which do not necessarily have the highest level of imperatival intensity (Ibid., 29-31). Idiomatic imperatives to avoid deception clearly do not; in the first example she cites (4 Kings 18:29) she recognizes the “command functions as a warning. The speaker wants the hearer . . .” (emphasis mine). She also recognizes that an imperative of “permission” functions on the (optative) level of request.

224 Imperatives in conditional constructs, by the very nature of the construction, are generally obligatory; if the protasis is true, it follows that the apodosis must be true. Thus, “If you come after me, you must deny yourself, etc.” However, the condition itself may be uttered in a context where the speaker is only expressing a desire (Matt 26:39), sarcasm (Matt 27:43), or a strong suggestion (John 7:37; 1 Cor 7:15, see p. 38).

225 See above p. 34 for the reflexive sense of this imperative. This does not suggest that Jesus was always required to heal people who had faith. It only suggests that semantically the context carries an obligatory force; any other level of intensity would be meaningless—Jesus did, in fact, perform the healings.

226 See above pp. 33-34.

desire (although it is), or simply exhorting the audience to listen; he is demanding it. In Acts 4:10 the imperative is in the apodosis of a condition (v. 9). If the protasis is true, the apodosis must follow, whether or not the audience accepts what Peter reveals.

Most of the imperatives in the epistles are obligatory and fairly straightforward. However, some, taken out of context, would appear to make little sense. For example, in 1 Cor 11:34 the apostle instructs the Corinthian saints, 

\[ \text{e\'i\' t\'e\ 'p\'e\'i\'n\'v, e\'n o\'i\'k\'o\' e\'s\'t\'h\'i\'e\'t\'o.} \]

The force of the imperative is obligatory as the apodosis of the indefinite condition. However, is Paul forbidding the church to eat when it assembles together? The protasis contains the understood meaning (in \( \text{p\'e\'i\'n\'v} \)) that the individual is not willing, or is unable, to submit to the command \( \text{\'a\'l\'l\'i\'l\'o\'u\'s e\'k\'d\'e\'x\'e\'s\'o\'\theta\') \) (v. 33); in such a case, eating at home is mandated. Paul cannot be forbidding what he has just allowed \( \text{s\'u\'n\'e\'r\'h\'o\'m\'e\'n\'o\'i e\'i\'\z\' t\'o f\'a\'g\'e\'i\'n}. \)

I have included 31 third person imperatives as having a hortative force; i.e., the imperative does not have full imperatival intensity, and only suggests a response. These can be best understood under four categories. The first category contains warnings—in light of possible circumstances, the subject is urged to respond in a certain manner. Jesus prophetically warned his disciples to flee Jerusalem when it was under siege by the Romans (Matt 24:15 - 18 and parallels). Paul warned the Ephesian saints not to be deceived by empty words (Eph 5:6).

The second category contains practical exhortations—given the circumstances, the subject is encouraged to accept certain realities or act in a certain manner. Jesus encourages his apostles in light of his departure (John 14:1, 27). James encourages the one who helps restore someone wandering from the truth (5:19 - 20).

A peculiar case occurs in Rev 22:11. The force of the imperatives is probably hortative, addressed to John (\( \kappa\'\a\'\i\'\ \lambda\'\e\'g\'e\i\' \mu\o\'t\i, \ v. 10). \)

In v. 10 the force of the subjunctive (\( \mu\'\i\' \sigma\'g\'r\'a\'\gamma\i\'s\'h\'e\'s, “do not seal up”) addressed to John is imperative. The general sense is that the book, with its revelations about coming judgment, is not to be

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228 This is similar to the various forms of the idiomatic expression \( \delta\' \text{\'e\'x\'o\'n \'o\'t\'a \'a\'k\'o\'\nu\'e\'t\'o} \) (see above p. 25).

229 See n. 123.

230 Voelz claims these imperatives “are clearly directed to John’s readers and are, therefore, ‘inappropriate’” (“Use of Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 95). By “inappropriate” Voelz means chronologically inappropriate because the coming of Christ was actually not temporally imminent. Thus, he calls these “specified case commands” (addressing a specific historical situation) that are “logically inapplicable” and, therefore, “transferred” from John’s immediate audience to the readers at the eschaton (84 - 94). This explanation is forced by a particular eschatological view of Revelation. Voelz could not have the commands directed at John (as the context indicates) for this would suggest Jesus was mistaken about his own return. However, Voelz is left with the same problem for the author of Revelation—that he was mistaken about the time of Christ’s return. Anticipating this, Voelz attempts to avoid the problem with this convoluted category of imperatives that allows the author to use temporal terminology when, in fact, he knows nothing of the timetable involved: “In so doing, his readers are confronted with the reality of the Lord’s non-temporal imminence, i.e. that he is able to ‘burst’ upon the scene at any and every moment, and the ‘specified case’ conveys the ‘pressure’ of God’s continual imminence, without diluting that pressure with commands which extend over a period of time” (89). More traditionally, Leon Morris accepts a non-temporal meaning for \( \tau\a\'\chi\'\u\' \) (“speedily”) in an eschatological context admitting “there will be no time for change” for the righteous and evil at that time. In the mean time, John calls his readers to repentance (The Book of Revelation: An Introduction and Commentary [2d ed.; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987]: 253, 255). Both of these views are based on exegesis governed by theology and not the text.
sealed up “for the time is near.” The imminence of the coming judgment is thematic in both the opening and closing of the book: ὁ καιρὸς γὰρ ἐγγὺς ἔστιν (1:3; 22:10); ἴδον ἔρχομαι τὰχύ (22:7, 12, 20; 3:11); ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐν τάχει (1:1; 22:6). This is in stark contrast to the revelations given Daniel: “seal up the vision for it pertains to many days hence” (8:26 cf. 10:14; 12:4, 9). If the visions of Daniel 8 were fulfilled in the second century BC Maccabean period, which is the consensus, and Daniel made the prophecies in the sixth century BC, a period of less than 400 years constitutes “many days hence.” Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that John’s revelations were to be fulfilled in less time, sometime in the immediate future.

Aside from theological considerations, the grammar and immediate context alone determine the sense of the imperatives. The imminence of the coming judgment suggests that the status of the evil and the righteous are not going to change before it occurs. No doubt, the righteous would heed “the words of the prophecy” and the unrighteous would not (1:3 cf. 2:21; see Ezek 3:27). Thus, John is directed to let each of them continue as they are.

It is highly unlikely that the unrighteous are addressed; they would not be encouraged to continue in unrighteousness. Thus, the righteous are only indirectly addressed as they read John’s record. John is therefore exhorted to allow the righteous to continue in righteousness (which would be expected), and the unrighteous to continue in unrighteousness (which would be unexpected). Time is the controlling factor; there is not enough time for the necessary heart changes to be made.


Whether this pertains to the fall of Jerusalem (AD70), the fall of Domitian in particular (AD96) or Rome in general (AD475), or some other imminent historical event depends on the dating of Revelation and one’s view of apocalyptic language. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that John’s words (“soon,” “near”) refer to some as yet fulfilled millennial or eschatological event. See Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., *Before Jerusalem Fell* (Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1989); John A. T. Robinson, *Redating the New Testament* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976): 221 - 253; Donald Guthrie, *New Testament Introduction* (Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 1990): 948 -962.

Winers, whether from an eschatological deterministic perspective or not, suggests this same sense: “let everyone by adhering to his present course grow ripe for Christ’s approaching judgment; the fate of all is, as it were, already determined” (*Idiom*, 311).

A similar idea is seen in Jeremiah, when the prophet was told not to pray for his people (7:16; 11:14; 14:11). Boyer sees these as “permissive imperatives; two are contrary to the will of the speaker, two are favorable” (“Classification of Imperatives,” 37). The speaker is the angel and John is the audience, while the reason for the permission is that, it “makes sense” (“Supplemental Manual of Information: Imperative Verbs,” [Winona Lake, Indiana: Grace Theological Seminary, 1987, Photocopied]: 43). Although Boyer does not explain why the commands “makes sense,” on the surface, this agrees with the position taken here.

This does not suggest that the admonitions in chapters 2 and 3 are empty (2:5, 10, 16, 25; 3:2, 10 - 11, 18 - 20; etc.). Those warnings are addressed to individual churches with some members threatening to fall away; the people do not fall into the category of ὁ ἑδικόν or ὁ ῥυπαρός. The “coming” of Christ (2:5) and the various warnings are contingent upon repentance of the individuals and
revelation to bring any substantial changes with regard to the universal status of the church and its adversaries. Repentance does not seem to be an option.

A third possible hortative category is *reasonable expectation*—given the circumstances, the subject is expected to act, or be able to act, in a particular manner. I have included only the conditional constructs in Luke 23:35 and Matt 27:43 in this class. Given the truth of the protasis, the imperative in the apodosis is reasonable, even though it is stated in mockery—the protasis is denied by those uttering the imperative. However, should Christ fulfill the imperative, they would accept the truth of the protasis (cf. Matt 27:42; Mark 15:32).

The final category on the hortative level is *permission*—given the circumstances, the subject is permitted, but not required, to act in a particular manner. I have included only the conditional construct in 1 Cor 7:15 in this class: the married disciple is given permission to divorce if the unbeliever seeks it. Most include more imperatives in the permissive category.

The final level of force is the optative—the imperative does not have imperatival intensity, but only expresses a wish or desire, requesting a response. The failure to respond would bring no consequences to the addressee, but perhaps a subjective response (discouragement, etc.) from the one making the request. All but one occurrence (Acts 21:14, which is essentially a statement of faith) are specifically related to prayer. The prayers are of two types: *reflexive*, the petition is made on behalf of self (Matt 26:39), and *imprecatory*, the petition is made against others (Acts 1:20a,b; Rom 11:9-10).

Responsible Party

As with second person imperatives, the party responsible to carry out the action in the majority (203) of third person imperatives is the immediate listening/reading audience, or a part thereof, as qualified; thus, they effectively act like second person imperatives. This may include the “implied” audience—those intended or expected to hear/read whether or not they are in the immediate audience. For example, Matt 5:16 addresses two immediate audiences: the crowds to whom Jesus was speaking and Matthew’s readers. The epistles obviously address one immediate audience—those to whom the epistles were written. Much has already been said about the responsible parties in Chapter II, particularly under “Emphatic Object Transfer.” The purpose here is to summarize.
In 19 cases, the responsible party is not in the listening/reading audience, nor is he/she expected to respond to the imperative apart from someone in the immediate audience acting as an intermediary. This is analogous to Glaze’s “true third person” given “through an intermediary.” Included in this category are Luke 16:29; Acts 16:37; 19:38; 24:20; nearly all the passages in 1 Timothy and Titus, which are addressed to these individuals.

The final 12 cases I have labeled “reflexive” because the speaker perceives himself as the responsible party. Most occur in prayers addressing God with an object transfer imperative (contiguous with second person imperatives in some cases) (Matt 6:9 - 10; Luke 11:2). A few occur in contexts with Jesus referring to his own healing actions in response to a person’s faith (Matt 8:13; 9:29; 15:28), or his own obedience to the Father’s will (Matt 26:42; Luke 22:42). Peter interprets a Psalm addressed to God as being fulfilled by himself and those with him appointing someone to fill Judas’ apostolic office (Acts 1:20c). The disciples who tried to persuade Paul not to go to Jerusalem unsuccessfully, declared “The Lord’s will be done,” referring to both themselves and Paul (Acts 21:14).

Two Case Studies

In this section, it is my intention to incorporate some of the results of this study that have interpretive value for particular passages. I have chosen two; the first (Acts 2:38) has greater theological significance than the second (1 Cor 14:28), but each has been affected.

The relationship of baptism to the forgiveness of sins in Acts 2:38 has long been discussed and variously resolved. In particular, the juxtaposition of the second and third person imperatives has been used to argue both for and against a direct relationship between baptism and forgiveness. However, this passage, perhaps as much as any other, has been the victim of eisegesis—theology controlling exegesis. Commenting on this passage Robertson states: “When the grammarian has finished, the theologian steps in, and sometimes before the grammarian is through.”

Much of the discussion revolves around the meaning of the preposition εἰς, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The question addressed here is the relationship

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240 In Luke 16:29 Luke, as the author, is the intermediary.
241 Septuagintal Use,” 12 - 15. Glaze also lists as a “true third person imperative” (without an intermediary) the type addressed directly to the responsible party but stated in the third person to produce a more diplomatic or less terse effect (Ibid., 15 - 17). This is often accomplished by making the third person subject an ideal or everyone. This is what I have classified as indeterminate subject transfers which are generally addressed directly to the responsible party(ies), i.e., the immediate listening/reading audience (the preceding category). They tend to narrow the focus on everyone in the immediate audience, and therefore do not have the mollifying effect Glaze suggests, unless it is addressed to a specific individual (see n. 116).
242 See nn. 117 and 190. See also p. 32 on Titus 3:14.
243 All occur in narrative contexts, none in the epistles.
244 See above pp. 32 - 35.
245 Grammar, 389.
between the two imperatives μετανοήσατε and βαπτίσθητο. Much has been made of the change from the second person to the third person, particularly when the causal use of εἰς is recognized as untenable. If forgiveness of sins is the result of repentance, as most agree, then the conjunctive force of καὶ with μετανοήσατε and βαπτίσθητο must be avoided, if baptism is not also understood to result in the forgiveness of sins.247 Roberts traces the argument for the disjunction between the two commands as far back as 1860.248 Concerning this disjunction, Robertson goes so far as to claim:

[There is a] change of number from plural to singular and of person from second to third. This change marks a break in thought here that the English translation does not preserve. The first thing to do is make a radical and complete change of heart and life. Then let each one be baptized after this change has taken place, . . . So I understand Peter to be urging baptism on each of them who had already turned (repented) and for it to be done in the name of Jesus Christ on the basis of the forgiveness of sins which they had already received (emphasis mine).249

Robertson appears to force the disjunction upon the text by theology.250 Had Peter’s audience already repented, the command to repent would have been meaningless.

Against a disjunction, Carroll Osburn argues that idiomatic usage allows for disagreement of person and number between Greek subjects and verbs, citing among other idioms the distributive use of the third person imperative singular with the second person imperative plural.251 However, the argument against the conjunction of the verbs in Acts 2:38 confuses the “rule” of concord in person and number between subject and verb—there is concord in this case—with an imagined “rule” that the same plural subject (in this case Peter’s audience) cannot be the subject of both a plural verb and a singular verb. Peter’s audience is the plural αὐτοῦς, thus the plural μετανοήσατε. The singular βαπτίσθητο is also in concord with its person and subject, ἐκαστός ὑμῶν, which is the same audience (plural ὑμῶν). The use of ἐκαστός in this way violates no “rule” of agreement between person and number in the subject of Greek verbs. That is not the issue in Acts 2:38. Clearly the subject of both verbs is the same, which can be demonstrated by removing either imperative: “And Peter said to them, ‘[You plural] repent in the name of Jesus etc.,’” or “And Peter said to them, ‘Each one of you (plural) must be baptized (singular, in agreement with ἐκαστός) in the name of Jesus etc.’”

247 The same is true if εἰς is understood as causal in relation to βαπτίσθητο. As most acknowledge repentance is not “because of” but “for the forgiveness of sins”; therefore, there must be a disjunction between the two commands so μετανοήσατε can be disassociated from εἰς ἄφεσιν κτλ.
248a “Baptism for Remission of Sins,” 231. On the other end of the spectrum, Frederick Dale Bruner pushes the aorist tenses too far, takes καί as epexegetical, and suggests there is no substantive difference between repentance and baptism: “repentance is not a long inner work (as would be expressed by an imperative verb in the present tense) but the once-for-all accepting of God’s offer through preaching of forgiveness by baptism (this is expressed perfectly by the aorist imperative). Repentance is being baptized” (A Theology of the Holy Spirit [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970]: 166).
Three of the examples Osburn cites (Josh 6:10; 4 Kings 10:19; 1 Macc 10:63) to demonstrate the distributive imperatival usage of third person in conjunction with second person imperatives are not strictly analogous to Acts 2:38. In each example there is a shift in the subject between the second and third person imperatives, even though the same audience is addressed and responsible to carry out the commands. These examples have object transfers in the third person imperatives, where subject transfers are required to be analogous with Acts 2:38.

I located over 80 passages in the Septuagint with second and third person imperatives in juxtaposition. Of these only ten are analogous to Acts 2:38. To be analogous, a single audience (with a plurality of subjects) must be addressed, there must be at least two juxtaposing second and third person imperatives, and a subject transfer must occur in the third person imperative. The transition from a second person plural to a third person singular imperative does not diminish the force or extent of either injunction upon the audience:

[Joshua] said to them [twelve men from the tribes of Israel], go (Προσαχάγαγετε) before me in the presence of the Lord in the midst of the Jordan, and having taken up a stone from there, each (ἐκἀστὸς) must carry (ἄρτο) it on his shoulders according to the number of the twelve tribes of Israel. (Josh 4:5)

In the New Testament, I was able to identify five additional passages with the same grammatical construction. In 1 Cor 16:1 - 2 Paul instructs his readers, “Now concerning the collection of the saints, as I directed the churches of Galatia, so also you do (ποιήσατε). Every first day of the week, each of you (ἐκαστὸς ὑμῶν) is to set [something] aside (τιθέη) by himself . . .” This is a subject transfer which shifts the focus from the whole audience (the Corinthian church) to each individual in the audience. In Eph 5:25, 33 there is a subject transfer (ἀγαπάτε . . . ἀγαπάτω) separated by considerable discussion, but grammatically the effect is identical.

The so-called disjunction between μετανοήσατε and βαπτίσθητω is also defended based on the plural ὑμῶν in the prepositional phrase εἰς ἀφεσιν τῶν

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252In Josh 6:10, Osburn appears to take the accusative (τὴν φωνὴν) as the subject of the third person imperative: “do not let the voice of anyone be heard.” However, the subject is μηθείς (μηθείς), “no one must hear your voice.” The remaining examples Osburn cites (Exod 16:29; Zech 7:10; Didache 15:3; Ignatius, Magnesians 6:2) each contain subject transfers and are therefore analogous (“Acts 2:38,” 83 - 84). Glaze, whom Osburn is following, also fails to see this distinction. It is she, however, who first noted the importance of this type of construction for the interpretation of Acts 2:38, and the other examples she cites are analogous (“Septuagintal Use,” 27 - 28).

253The order is not significant, nor would another imperatival form alter the effect. For example Jer 18:11 has a third person imperative followed by a second person future indicative in Vaticanus and Sinaiticus, but a second person imperative in Alexandrinus (see also Exod 16:29; Lev 19:3; 3 Kings 12:24; 4 Kings 11:5). Humphreys cites an example from Plato Crit. 45 with a second person subjunctive followed by a third person imperative (object transfer): μήτε ταύτα φοβοῦμενος ἀποκάμψῃ σαυτὸν σώσαι, μήτε ὁ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δίκαιωτα ὄσυχης σοι γενέσθο (“On Negative Commands,” 47).

254See also Ezek 20:7; Hag 2:4; Zech 7:10.

255See also 1 Cor 7:23 - 24; 10:24 - 25 (in reverse order).

256See also Gal 6:2, 4 - 5 where a second person plural imperative (βαστάζετε, v. 2) is followed by ἐκαστὸς and a third person singular imperative (δοκιμαζέτω, v. 4) and (possibly) a third person singular imperatival future (βαστάσει, v. 5).
It is argued the plural ὑμῶν agrees only with the plural μετανοήσατε, and therefore goes only with repentance. It cannot go with the singular βαπτισθήτω. Lanny Thomas Tanton considers this position, and argues that the grammars do not deal with agreement between number in verbs and prepositional phrases, as if that were an argument against the position, and so he dismisses it.²⁵⁷

Luther B. McIntyre Jr. is the most recent advocate of the so-called “rule of concord” between the pronoun ὑμῶν in the prepositional phrase and the verbs as the major grammatical argument against the necessity of baptism.²⁵⁸ He states, “The basic rule of concord stipulates that a personal pronoun (in this case ὑμῶν) agrees with its antecedent in gender and number.”²⁵⁹ Following the idea of concord between subject and predicate, he argues the plural ὑμῶν of the prepositional phrase can only have as its antecedent the subject of the plural verb, “repent,” and not the singular verb, “be baptized.” He dismisses Osburn’s idiomatic exception based on the use of second and third person imperatives in conjunction because he claims the examples cited do have concord between verbs and pronouns. As he cited Osburn, this is true; however, Osburn did not cite the complete passage of Zech 7:10, and presumably McIntyre did not examine the text itself. The final phrase of the text connects the plural pronoun ὑμῶν directly to a singular third person imperative: καὶ κακίαν ἐκαστὸς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ μνησικακεῖτο ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν. According to McIntyre’s “rule” of concord between pronoun and its antecedent, this passages breaks the rule.²⁶⁰ However, the preceding is not even necessary to demonstrate that the audience of all of Acts 2:38 is one, and that the second person plural μετανοήσατε, the third person singular with ἐκαστὸς ὑμῶν, and ὑμῶν in the prepositional phrase all point back to αὐτοῦς. The plural ὑμῶν in the prepositional phrase has as its immediate antecedent the plural ὑμῶν in the phrase ἐκαστὸς ὑμῶν which is the subject of the singular βαπτισθήτω. Plural agreement is found for both verbs in the form of the first, and in the subject pronoun of the second.

McIntyre’s conclusion as to the place of the command for baptism in Peter’s statement is pure casuistry:

. . . the command to be baptized is parenthetical and is not syntactically connected to remission of sins. When Peter commanded the people to repent, he was speaking to the crowd. Then the command to be baptized was directed to each individual. In the “remission of your sins” phrase, Peter again directed his words to the crowd collectively.²⁶¹

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²⁵⁹Ibid., 54 - 55.
²⁶⁰See also above on 1 Cor 16:2 where ὑμῶν and Eph 5:33 where ὑμεῖς are each used with singular third person imperatives.
²⁶¹Ibid., 57.
He does not explain what the essential difference is in addressing “the crowd” and “each individual” in the crowd. He has created these artificial categories through a strained exegesis of the passage based on equally artificial “rules” of Greek grammar.

The various attempts to circumvent the most natural meaning of this passage have fallen short. Exegesis governed by theology has resulted in many convoluted grammatical arguments that cannot stand under careful examination. The distinction between subject and object transfers delineated in this thesis has helped clarify the issue; it is not simply a matter of second and third person imperatives in juxtaposition. Peter’s address to his audience is a clear example of a subject transfer where the subject of the third person imperative is always transferred from a second person imperative (in this case actual) in the same context. The effect, in this context, is to emphasize the personal responsibility of each person (third person singular) in the audience (second person plural) for his or her participation (direct or indirect) in the death of the Messiah. The sins of each person necessitated the gospel; no one could conceal his or her responsibility in the corporate sin of the audience. The baptism of each person would reveal this to all.\footnote{A second passage this study sheds light on is 1 Cor 14:27 - 28—εἰτε γλώσσῃ τις λαλεῖ, κατὰ δύο ἦ = τὸ πλείστον τρεῖς καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰς διερμηνευτόν ἕναν δὲ μὴ ἢ διερμηνευτής, σιγάτω ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἕως ὧ διλαλεῖτο καὶ τῷ θεῷ. The phrase κατὰ δύο ἦ = τὸ πλείστον τρεῖς καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος modifies (restricts) τις with regard to the number of people speaking tongues in any given assembly. The third person imperative in the apodosis is probably the referent of τις (regardless of whether it is the first, second, or third speaker). Most of the translations, however, are ambiguous as to the subject of διερμηνευτό. Generally it is translated “let one interpret” (NASB, NAB, NRSV, KJV), occasionally “let someone interpret” (NIV), suggesting that someone other than one of the tongue speakers is to interpret. “Let one (εἰς) interpret” is literal; εἰς is probably a reference to one of the two or three tongues speakers, if two or three speak. The use of the third person imperative in the apodosis suggests it is the tongue speaker himself—or one of the tongue speakers—who is to interpret. Otherwise, this is the only occurrence of an indefinite conditional construct in the sources examined where a subject shift occurs between the apodosis and the protasis. Omitting the modifying clause and the εἰς necessitated by the clause, limits the confusion: “If anyone speaks in a tongue, he must interpret.”

Verse 28 can be translated consistently with either understanding mentioned above. The conditional construct is generally understood to mean: “If there is not an interpreter, he (the tongue speaker) must be silent etc.” This continues to leave the identity of the interpreter ambiguous—it could be, but does not demand, someone other than the tongue speakers themselves (cf. 12:10). However, it can be translated: “If he (the subject of the preceding condition) is not an interpreter, he (the same subject who speaks in a tongue) must remain silent.”\footnote{The direct relationship of repentance, baptism, and the forgiveness of sins would not be a new concept to Peter’s audience (Luke 3:3).}

\footnote{Porter, citing Conzelmann, recognizes the possibility of this translation (Verbal Aspect, 319). See also G. G. Findlay, “whether one of the γλωσσολαλοῦντες (13), or someone else present (ἄλλος, xii, 10)” (St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians [EGNT; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917; reprint, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976]: 912). Note also in v. 29 a clear
The interpretation suggested here consistently retains the same subject throughout. Likewise, it is consistent with Paul’s use of the verb elsewhere in this chapter: “greater is the one prophesying than the one speaking in tongues unless he (i.e., the one speaking tongues, not *someone, τις, or another, ἄλλος*) interprets” (v. 5); “therefore the one speaking a tongue must pray that he might interpret” (v. 13). Nothing in the context of this chapter or Paul’s only other use of the verb διαδιηνέω (1 Cor 12:30, see also Luke 24:27; Acts 9:36) militates against this understanding of 14:27 - 28. Thus, it is more consistent with the characteristics of indefinite conditional constructs and the context than the traditional understanding which introduces a new subject.

distinction is made between the προφήται δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς who speak, and ὁι ἄλλοι who discern. The article (ὁi) may refer to προφητεία not of the δύο ἢ τρεῖς, although apparently some without the gift of προφητεία did have the gift of διακρίσεις πνευμάτων (12:10).
CHAPTER IV  
FUNCTION OF THE PRESENT AND AORIST FORMS  
IN THE THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

The non-temporal nature of the imperative mood raises a question as to the functions of the present and aorist forms. The discussion that attempts to answer the question is often focused on the relationship of the imperative to the action itself, in reality. In other words, what was the nature of the action addressed by the imperative at the time it was spoken or written: existent or non-existent? In both prescriptive and prohibitive imperatives, were the present and aorist forms chosen based on whether or not the action was already in process?

This question has been answered basically two ways. The “traditional school” answers “Yes.” The present form addresses action already in progress, “Continue in what you are doing,” or “Stop what you are doing.” The aorist form addresses action not already in progress: “Start to do something,” or “Do not start to do something.” Of course, all who hold to this general “canon,” acknowledge “exceptions.” Of course, all who hold to this general “canon,” acknowledge “exceptions.”

The “aspectual school” answers “No.” Not only do the exceptions militate against such a rule, but those of this school argue that the traditional understanding of tense itself has been misguided. It is better to understand the choice of tense forms based simply on the way the speaker/author viewed the action as he spoke/wrote it (aorist, as a whole; present, in progress), irrespective of the action as it may actually exist.

Against the traditional school, it would seem the works of numerous scholars would have put the issue to rest long ago, especially with regard to the imperative in general. Nevertheless, most grammarians and interpreters continue on traditional assumptions.

The results of this study are in accord with those that challenge the traditional view. The question mentioned above was continually before me as I examined each passage individually. Nothing unique about the use of the present and aorist forms with the third person imperative was revealed in the course of this study. What has elsewhere

264 I use the term “school” not to indicate a formal group of scholars, but only to delineate the two general approaches. The traditional school likewise suggests the kind of action also governs tense choice.

266 See Chapter I, “Critical Issues.”

268 The separate issue, although related and sometimes confused, concerning the kind of action (Aktionsart) communicated by the tense form (ingressive, progressive, “once-for-all,” punctiliar, cessative, etc.), is likewise held by some as a factor in tense choice. Thus, if action was not in progress, and was to begin, the (ingressive) aorist was used.

269 See Chapter I, “The Question of Tense.”


been concluded about imperatives in general, held true for the third person specifically.\(^{270}\) In brief, the traditional approach to the present and aorist forms that suggests they are chosen in relation to the nature of the existing action failed to be upheld by at least three factors: context, nature of the material, and grammar.

**Context**

The use of the present and aorist forms in over 25 percent of the third person imperatives militates against the traditional understanding, when examined in context. The traditional view of the prohibitive present ("Stop!") would require that Peter’s readers were suffering as murders, thieves, evildoers, and meddlers (1 Pet 4:15). In Matt 9:30 μη δεῖς γινωσκέτω makes little sense if the people already know—"Stop letting anyone know!"\(^{271}\)

Do the prescriptive aorists (traditionally understood to mean "Start!") in Rev 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22; 13:9 mean that none in the churches had been listening, and the prescriptive presents in Matt 11:15; 13:9, 43; Mark 4:9, 23; Luke 8:8; 14:35 (traditionally understood to mean "Continue!") mean the audiences had already been listening?\(^{272}\) Likewise, in Rev 22:11 the aorists could not mean, "Start"—ο ἄδικον ἄδικησάτω ἐτι κτλ.\(^{273}\)

\(^{270}\)In general, Boyer’s statistical study on imperatives is very impressive on this point. If his figures are accurate, even given a large margin of error for interpretive differences, the traditional view is demolished. Examining prohibitive present imperatives, he determined that in only about 22 percent of 174 cases could it be demonstrated that action already existed in the context. In nearly the same amount of cases it could be demonstrated that the action in the context was non-existent, even already discontinued in a few cases ("Classification of Imperatives," 43 - 45).

\(^{271}\)Winer recognizes this obvious “exception” to the “rule” (Idiom, 501). See also Luke 21:21c; 1 Cor 7:12 - 13.

\(^{272}\)Post argues, in reference to Classical dramatic Greek, that aorist imperatives, unlike the present, of verbs like ἀκούω imply that the audience has ceased to listen or was not listening: “the aorist calls for limited attention—brief, easy, or merely physical; the present demands mental activity and a more than superficial consideration” (“Dramatic Uses,” 53 - 54). This may be the case with second person imperatives used at the beginning of an instruction, but all aorist and present third person examples in the New Testament follow significant instructions demanding careful consideration in every case. McKay’s explanation of the differences between the presents and the aorists in these contexts is unconvincing. He suggests the presents in the synoptics call for “continuing attentiveness,” while the aorists in the Apocalypse concern specific messages where attention should be turned and taken in “rather than to be attentive to its implications” (“Aspect in Imperatival Constructions,” 215 - 216). Although it is true Jesus’ discussions in the synoptics are more difficult to understand than those in the Apocalypse (except in Rev 13:9), this does not suggest the implications of the latter do not require the same attentiveness. The implications of not listening in either case are essentially the same. Of special note are the two indefinite first class conditions each with a different tense (present in Mark 4:23, aorist in Rev 13:9). Who is to say the audience in Revelation was better able to understand than the audience in Mark? Porter is probably correct that the kind of action in the verbs in this idiom is omnitemporal (Verbal Aspect, 302). It may be simply a matter of timing for the speaker; when he used the idiom in his ministry, he viewed the action as in progress (present tense, without reference to beginning or ending), following his glorification he viewed it as a whole single action (aorist, without reference to beginning or ending). In both cases, he was simply commanding what must always be true of his followers.

\(^{273}\)Every major version translates all four of these aorists as action already in progress: “Let the one being unrighteous continue to do (still be) unrighteousness.” For other examples of prescriptive aorists that probably do not mean “Start” see Matt 6:9 - 10; 26:42; Luke 11:2; Rom 11:9 - 10; Heb 1:6.
In many cases of the prescriptive present, “Continue,” makes little sense. In Mark 13:14 Jesus says τότε (indicates the action about to be suggested is inceptive) ὅτι ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ ἐφεύρετοσαν εἰς τὰ ὀργά. In Acts 2:14 Peter addresses his audience with the words γνωστόν ἔστω καὶ ἑνωτίσουσθε τὰ ῥήματά μου. The context is clear that the audience did not already know what he was about to tell them.274

Often, trying to maintain the traditional position leads to interpretive difficulties. What is the fundamental difference between Luke’s use of the present γινέσθω (22:42) and Matthew’s use of the aorist γεννηθήτω (26:42)?275 Likewise, other parallel uses of present with aorist forms are problematic.276 In Deut 20:5-8 the present πορεύεσθαι is conjoined to the aorist ἀποστραφῆτο denoting essentially the same action, both of which are necessarily ingressive as indicated by the context.

Also, when the present and aorist forms are compared in a given context, the traditional view becomes awkward. Such is the case in Eph 4:26-5:6. Winer cites part of Paul’s paraenesis (4:25-26, 28) in support of the traditional hypothesis that the present imperative “denotes action already begun and to be continued . . ., or one that is permanent and frequently recurring.” However, he has to take it back in his discussion on 5:6: “On the other hand, the Pres. Imperat. also [as the aorist imperative] is often used in reference to what should not be begun at all.”277 Louw points out

... the use of words like πλέον (μηκέτι [as in 4:28], πέρα etc. shows clearly that the action referred to is going on, and it proves the point that the present

274For other examples of the prescriptive present that probably do not mean “Continue” see Matt 18:17; 19:12; 24:15 - 16; Luke 3:11b; 21:21a,b; John 7:37; Acts 2:36; 4:10; 13:38; 19:38; 25:25; 28:28; Rom 15:2; 1 Cor 4:1; 7:36; 11:28a; 14:13, 26 - 30, 34 - 35, 40; 16:2, 14; 2 Cor 10:7, 11; 12:16; Gal 1:8 - 9; Eph 5:33; 1 Tim 2:11. See also 1 Mac 10:33; 15:8 (note ἀπό τοῦ γόνιμο πανταχρόνου ἁφεθεθεντο σαί, “it must be forgiven you from now unto all time”); Josephus Ant. 7.271 (a present stative verb replaces an aorist action verb in the Septuagint at 2 Kings 19:31); 9.146; and Philo Spec. Leg. 1.102; 2.36 - 37; 3.69 - 71, 184; Ebr. 52.3.

275Luke’s use of the present imperative in prayer is curious; most are aorist. Voelz suggests it is “emphatic” (Jesus is making his point with force) or a “signal” (for God to act) in a stressful situation (“Use of the Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 46). Yet the same context exists for the speaker in Matt 26:42. In this case, an explanation cannot be found in the actual event itself, it must be found (if at all) in the written documents. McKay states, “the comparison of the two wills leads to greater emphasis on the process (in the coming event let your will be the one being carried out)” (“Aspect in Imperatival Constructions,” 214). Porter views it as a “rhetorically balanced sentence to draw attention to Jesus’ choice of destiny” (Verbal Aspect, 350). Whatever the case, it appears Luke’s fine quality Greek allowed the use of the present tense in prayer imperatives. Statistically, however, even Luke adheres to the prevailing use of the aorist imperative in prayer language—three presents in 17 (plus 4 variants) imperatives.

276See for example Rom 15:11; 1 Cor 7:9 (aorist) with v. 36 (present). The obvious difficulty 1 Cor 7:9, 36 presents for the traditional view is often overlooked. William Martin maintains the aorist is used because of its “particular” nature as opposed to the “universal” nature of the present tense, the aorist describing “a specific action, limited in duration,” thus, ingressive or egressive. In opposition to this he places the present tense which describes “an action of unlimited extension or habitual occurrence” (“1 Corinthians 11:2 - 16: An Interpretation,” Apostolic History and the Gospel [eds. W. Ward Gasque and Ralph P. Martin; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970]: 235). However, Martin makes no mention of v. 36. On the other hand, BDF suggests the present in v. 36 is used to describe the quality of behavior of the subject (Greek Grammar, 172). Again, they make no mention of v. 9.

277Idiom, 313, 501.
imperative does not, or rather does not *per se* indicate that the action has already commenced at the time of speaking.\(^{278}\)

In other words, these adverbs would be redundant if the idea of continuing action was inherent in the present tense. If κλεπτέω negated by μη meant “Stop stealing!” by virtue of the present tense, μηκέτι κλεπτέω would be pleonastic.\(^{279}\)

The reason for the aorist (ἀφθητο) in Eph 4:31 is difficult to determine, particularly since it is buried in a series of 17 imperatival present forms. It may be simply that the verb favors the aorist, particularly in the imperative.\(^{280}\) The present imperatives with “lists” in 4:32 and 5:3 suggest the single aorist choice has nothing to do with the list *per se*.\(^{281}\) In this case, it may be set in contrast with the present γίνεσθε (4:32) that governs the virtues. The removal of the vices is viewed as a *whole*, suggesting completeness (thus, the aorist), whereas the virtues are viewed as *ongoing* (thus, the present). Whatever the case, the presence of this aorist does damage to the traditional view. Paul could not be telling his readers to *start* removing “bitterness and anger and wrath and clamor and slander . . . with all evil” and at the same time tell them to *continue* “to be kind, tenderhearted, forgiving to each other.” There is a high probability these actions could not co-exist.

Nature of the Material

In many cases, particularly in the epistles, it is difficult to determine whether or not an action was already in progress. Many imperatives in the epistles (some in the narrative material, as well as in the teachings of Jesus) are general in nature, not necessarily addressing existing actions or the lack of them, usually favoring the present tense.\(^{282}\) The most obvious type of general admonitions are in legal material where the present eclipses the aorist imperative.\(^{283}\) In the Septuagint most legal admonitions are in the future tense (which clearly does not address existing actions), but where the present and aorist are found, the present still dominates.\(^{284}\) In this way, the nature of the material

\(^{278}\) On Greek Prohibitions,” 49.

\(^{279}\) The present participle ο γκέπτων has been understood different ways. Blass takes it as antecedent action with an imperfect sense, “who stole up to now” (Greek Grammar, 175). Markus Barth understands it as contemporaneous, “the apostle reckons with thieves in their midst” (Ephesians 4 - 6 [AB 34A; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1974]: 515). Andrew Lincoln suggests the articular construction has the effect of making the participle a noun giving it “a timeless force” (Ephesians [WBC 42; Dallas: Word Incorporated, 1990]: 303). The last view is best; there is no way of knowing with certainty which of the many sins Paul deals with in this letter actually were present among the Ephesians.

\(^{280}\) There are 22 aorist, four present imperatives of αἰρετ in the New Testament (67 aorists to 21 presents in all moods); in the Septuagint the ratio is 24 aorists to one present (127 aorists to 108 presents in all moods).

\(^{281}\) Voelz, “Use of the Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 56.

\(^{282}\) Bakker defines general admonitions as those where “the speaker expresses a prohibition or command that does not apply to the situation in which it is expressed, or to a special situation that will arise later, but is valid always, or for a definite period” (Greek Imperative, 33). In general admonitions both stems are found, but the present predominates (Ibid., 33 - 35).

\(^{283}\) In randomly selected sections from Philo (Spec. Leg. 2.36 - 38; 3.69 - 71; 4.22 - 25) and Josephus (Ant. 4.200 - 286) the present outnumbered the aorist 101 to 4.

\(^{284}\) See for example Exod 21; Lev 21; and Deut 20 where most of the commands are futures with only 19 presents and 5 aorists. Glaze notes that “both decrees and the pronouncement of punishment are
argues against the traditional view that the particular tense form was chosen as it related to existing action.

Likewise, because of the general nature of much of the Pauline material, it is not surprising that over 75 percent of the total imperatives are in the present form. However, one would be hard pressed to hold that all of Paul’s choices for the present tense were made because of existing situations. Conversely, nearly 67 percent of Petrine imperatives are aorist. Does this suggest Peter was not addressing existing situations? Context must finally determine whether or not actions demanded or condemned were already in progress. Although it is likely real situations sometimes motivated paraenesis (e.g., Rom 14), such need not always be the case (e.g., Eph 4).

Some words that favor a particular tense militate against the suggestion that tense form is chosen based on its relationship to the action. For example, all the imperatival forms of ἐπιμένω occur in the present. Does this mean they always address action that is on going? The opposite seems to be true. In didactic material, it is generally omnitemporal (Matt 5:37; 18:17; Luke 12:35; 1 Cor 16:22; Gal 1:8 - 9; Jas 1:19; 5:12; 1 Pet 3:3). In conversational material, it generally has an ingressive sense (Acts 2:14; 4:10; 13:38; 28:28).

Some verbs by their very nature take a particular form in the imperative. For example, 199 of 209 occurrences in the Greek Bible of imperative forms of the cognates διδωμι and ἀποδιδωμι are aorist. This is likely because the action is generally viewed as a whole, rather than as a progression. Thus, Jesus used the aorist in Matt 5:31. Paul on the other hand used the rare present (1 Cor 7:3; Eph 4:27). Was it because he was addressing actions already on going, or was it his propensity for the present in general admonitions, which have an omnitemporal sense?

The nature of some words in and of themselves prohibits the idea that the present tense addresses action that is already in process. The clearest examples are those words commanding someone be put to death (e.g., Matt 15:4; Mark 7:10; Lev 20:10 - 16; 24:16 - 21). The injunction cannot possibly mean “put him to death as you have been doing.” The present imperative of ἔρχομαι is fatal to the traditional view that the present imperative refers to action already in progress; nearly every case is ingressive.

marked by the absence of the aorist imperative,” and that “most third person present imperatives in this category are found in Casuistic law where all cases are hypothetical . . . aorist imperative predominates in actual legal cases” (“Septuagintal Use,” 61 - 62).

Of third person imperatives, only ten of 98 are aorist. Three are retained from Old Testament quotes (Rom 11:9 - 10; 15:11), two are from aorist biased imperatives (Eph 4:31; 2 Tim 2:19), one is from an aorist biased imperative in the Septuagint but present biased in the New Testament (Phil 4:5). Four show no tense bias and are all used in 1 Corinthians (3:18b; 7:9, 11b; 11:6a). 1 Cor 7:9 is particularly difficult to understand in view of v. 36. The percentage of all imperatives that are aorist in the epistles is ca. 28, ca. 56 in the narrative material, and ca. 69 in Revelation.

It is interesting that the imperative of τελευτάω is present biased—all 11 occurrences (Matt 15:4; Mark 7:10; Exod 21:17; 35:2; Lev 24:16; Deut 32:50; Job 2:9; 4 Macc 6:22; Philo Fug. 83 [2]; Jos. 216). McKay suggests the present aspect of a stative verb “must refer to due process for a capital offense, and not to summary execution” (“Aspect in Imperatival Constructions,” 215). This interpretation is forced by his definition of the present aspect. The present (“imperfective”) aspect which views the action as in process need not require any given time period.

Finally, certain grammatical considerations undermine the traditional view of tense choice for imperatives. The use of adverbial modifiers creates difficulties if the kind of action is inherent to the tense form. The adverb τῶτε in Matt 24:16 (and parallels) indicates the action in the present imperative is ingressive, and therefore not already in progress. In 2 Cor 10:7 πᾶλιν is used with the present λογίζεσθο. Apparently, Paul’s opponents in Corinth had stopped considering Paul’s standing in Christ. Again, the present must be ingressive.

The use of μηκέτι with κληπτέω in Eph 4:28 prevents the traditional view.

Conversely, the adverbial aorist construction ἀδικησάτω ἐτί in Rev 22:11 demonstrates that the prescriptive aorist imperative cannot always be understood to mean “Start.” Likewise, the so-called “punctiliar” or “once-for-all” notion is undermined.

The imperatives in the apodeses of conditional constructs are timeless and generally omnitemporal, regardless of the temporal relation to existing action in the context. Of 54 conditional constructs, 38 have present (16 aorist) imperatives in the apodeses. In one case, Matt 16:24 (and parallels), the apodosis has three prescriptive imperatives (two aorists followed by one present): ἀπαρνησάσθω ἐαντὸν καὶ ἀράτω τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖτω μοι. If traditional thinking is followed, Jesus is telling his disciples already following him to start to deny themselves and pick up their crosses. However, the apodosis describes what ὁπίσω μου ἔλθειν in the protasis truly means, which is precisely what they are not doing: Ὡπαγε ὁπίσω μου, Σατανᾶ (v. 23 with vv. 21 - 22). The aorists with ἀπαρνέομαι and ἀίρο, and the present with ἀκολουθεῖω is what might be expected.

The speaker is viewing the

Ralph Martin points out that “εἰ τὶς πέποιθεν clearly has a specific object in Paul’s sights: it is his opposition in Corinth, the men—he personalized as a single number (τις) as in Gal 5:10; Col 2:8—who made pretentious claims which Paul is seeking to resist” (2 Corinthians, 307).

See above pp. 54 - 55.

Leon Morris, who otherwise appeals to the “once-for-all” nature of the aorist and “continuous” nature of the present tense in his commentary on Revelation, is silent on “the most natural way of taking the aorists” in 22:11; indeed, he recognizes they represent continuing action (Revelation, 83, 97, 115, 252).

The temporal relation of the apodosis to the protasis is a separate issue. See James L. Boyer, “First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean,” Grace Theological Journal 2 (1981): 75 - 82; “Third (and Fourth) Class Conditions,” Grace Theological Journal 3 (1982): 163 - 174; Porter, Verbal Aspect, 301 - 302, 316 - 320; Idioms, 254 - 267; and D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984): 80 - 82. The distinction between timeless and omnitemporal is confusing. For example, Robertson states in reference to the gnomic (omnitemporal) present: “This is the aorist present that is timeless in reality, true of all time” (Grammar, 866). Likewise, McKay refers to the “timeless (gnomic) aorist” (Syntax, 47). Porter differentiates omnitemporal as “occurring at any and all times,” and timeless as “not restricted to any temporal sphere of reference” (Idioms, 312, 314). He demonstrates, by examples, how both ideas apply to all tense forms (Ibid., 32 - 33, 38 - 39, 41 - 42, 44). I use the term “timeless” of present or aorist imperatives in contexts having no specified reference to whether or not the action is actually occurring or about to occur at the time of the statement or writing. The term “omnitemporal” is reserved for events that are to occur at all times, or at least when occasion arises (“your light must shine”), but still have no specified reference to actual occurrence.

Aiρο nearly always has the aorist in the imperative in the Greek Bible (46 aorists, 5 presents), while ἀκολουθεῖω favors the present (16 presents, 3 aorists). There are no other imperatives or imperatival forms of ἀρνέομαι, and only two aorists of ἀπαρνέομαι in the Greek Bible.
actions of self-denial and cross-bearing (probably synonymous)\textsuperscript{293} as complete (whole) decisive actions, and the action of following as a process.\textsuperscript{294} This condition is always true (omnitemporal) and timeless—its connection with the existing situation has no effect on the tenses chosen.

Must it be inferred from ἀκούετω (Mark 4:23) that Jesus’ audience was listening, and from ἀκούσατω (Rev 13:9) that John’s audience was not listening?\textsuperscript{295}

If the traditional “rules” were applied to 1 Cor 11:6 they would self-defeat: “If a woman is not now (present) covered, she must cut it (aorist). But if it is (present implied) shameful for her to cut it or shave it (aorists), she must continue (present) to cover her head.” Thus, she is both not covered and must continue to cover her head as she is already doing; the second apodosis should have an aorist if the traditional view is correct. However, it seems clear Paul has not chosen his tenses based on what may or may not be going on in the Corinthian church. The timeless (and omnitemporal) nature of conditional constructs give him the freedom to state what is to be done without making direct accusations.\textsuperscript{296}

\textsuperscript{293}Joseph A. Fitzmyer offers a common view of cross-bearing as a “readiness for martyrdom, but also of suffering the opposition and hostility met in everyday life” (The Gospel According to Luke, I - IX [AB 28; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1981]: 787). Although it may come to those things, it seems unlikely that persecution and martyrdom are prerequisites for following Christ. It is more natural to take it with self-denial as a metaphor for putting the self to death (Gal 2:19; 6:14, but see n. 294).

\textsuperscript{294}The aorists are not “once for all” actions as καθ’ ἡμέραν in Luke clearly demonstrates. This phrase also militates against the ingressive use of the aorists, once the initial change of allegiance has been made. Likewise, the present tense at the initial transformation must be ingressive. Dana and Mantey, following Winer (Idiom, 313), demonstrate the traditional approach citing Matt 16:24 as an example of the aorist meaning “at once” and the present meaning “continually” (Manual Grammar, 300). The context (particularly in light of Luke’s parallel) suggests the action of the aorist is to be done “continually” or at least repeatedly (iterative aorist), and the action of the present is also to be done “at once.” Likewise, Turner makes an artificial distinction between self-denial as “a decision, once and for all” and following as “a continuous discipline” (Grammar, 76). However, both are decisions and disciplines that must be made/practiced continuously (καθ’ ἡμέραν, which Turner omits as a harmonizing variant reading, as in some MSS). Note especially the present tenses in Matt 10:38 (“receive his cross”) and Luke 14:27 (“carry his cross”), as well as the phrase καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀποθνῄσκο (present tense) in 1 Cor 15:31 which is not a direct application, but has the same sense. There is a sense in which the believer dies “once and for all” with Christ (Gal 2:19, χριστῷ συνεσκεύασται, perfect tense, see also Rom 6:2 - 11). However, In Galatians and Romans Paul is discussing the conversion experience, in Matt 16:24 and parallels Jesus is discussing praxis (see 1 Pet 2:21).

Martin introduces another category for ἀπαρνησίασθο, “egressive,” which means “specific actions of limited duration” (“1 Corinthians 11:2 - 16,” 236). However, it is unclear how self-denial can be viewed as a limited action, unless Martin means a “once and for all” action. He suggests the present tense is used with ἀκολούθεω because the action has unspecified duration, where as an aorist is used with this verb when an end point is explicitly stated, as in Luke 22:10 (Ibid.). This is generally true; however, there are only two other aorist imperatives in the Greek Bible (Num 22:20; Mark 14:13), and neither explicitly states the destination, although in Mark it is implied. Likewise, the present tense is used in Acts 12:8 with an implied destination.

\textsuperscript{295}See n. 272.

\textsuperscript{296}William Martin takes the present tense as universal, action of “unlimited extension,” and the aorist as particular action, “limited in duration;” the aorist has a “cessative force,” while the present describes “non-terminative, inchoative action” (“1 Corinthians 11:2 - 16,” 235, 239). While this may be true concerning the action of the tenses, it is derived from semantics and the context rather than the tenses themselves. Against Martin, Porter suggests the tense difference places the emphasis on the covering: “The structure forms an inclusio, in which the Present verb reinforces the desired condition of the woman
In 1 Tim 5:3 - 16 there is a series of 13 present tense imperatival forms, including four third person imperatives, three of which are in conditional constructs (vv. 4, 9 - 10, 16). All the presents must be viewed as timeless; they do not inherently reveal the conditions stated as preexisting; if they are, that information must be implied in the context. Note the difficulty v. 16 gives to the traditional interpretation: “If any believing woman has widows, she must continue (as she has been) to assist them, and stop burdening the church.” With this understanding of the present tenses, Paul’s injunction offers nothing by way of his objective—lifting the burden on the church. The traditional view would require an aorist (ἐπιρρήσεις) in the apodosis instructing the believing woman to “start assisting.”

The results drawn from the analysis of every third person imperative in the New Testament, and only partially reviewed in this chapter, suggest that the author’s (speaker’s) tense choice was not governed by the situation, as it actually existed in his audience. Approaching the text with preconceived “rules” as to how the tenses relate to the existing situation leads to confusing, awkward, and sometimes absurd interpretations.

being covered, with the Aorist used of the alternative not to be sought” (Verbal Aspect, 358). Voelz takes issue with Martin’s use of the aorist meaning “remain for the time being” (“Use of the Present and Aorist Imperatives,” 345). Voelz’s objection is not clear, unless he means the aorist is inappropriate of imperatives of action already in process. However, even if it could be demonstrated that the aorist imperative could not be used in such situations, the imperative in this case is directed at the church to start permitting the action that presumably they were not allowing, or were questioning. Voelz’s objection appears to assume that tenses in conditional statements are not timeless. He explains the aorist as a means “to emphasize the specified action, i.e., ‘let this one thing be done.’ A present imperative would have suggested an alternative, continuing, policy, which Paul does not want to suggest!” (Ibid.). This does not appear to be that dissimilar to what Martin implies in his interpretation.

In reference to this verse, Marcia Moore erroneously cites Robertson (Grammar, 855 - 856) in support of the view that “the present imperative indicates an action which is to begin now and be continued” (“The ‘Widows’ in 1 Tim. 5:3 - 16,” 337). Robertson does not suggest this. She correctly cites him (Grammar, 890) concerning μὴ with the present imperative as forbidding action already in progress (Ibid.). It follows that if the prohibitive present referred to action already in progress, so would the prescriptive present, which is exactly the position of those who hold the traditional view. Moore is likely correct that ἐπιρρήσεις is ingressive, but this is determined contextually, not grammatically.
CHAPTER V

TRANSLATING THE THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

Having examined the third person imperative with regard to the functions of mood and tense, what are the English forms that best communicate the meaning of the Greek text? The absence of a corresponding English form for the Greek third person imperative requires that forms be chosen which best communicate the original meaning—as much as it can be understood—without compromising certain elements of the known syntactical and semantic categories. Therefore, the Greek imperatives with respect to their relationship to other elements in the structural unit, the level of imperative intensity, and the party(ies) responsible to execute the action (Chapter III) must be taken into consideration.

The issues raised concerning the choice of the present and aorist tense forms in Greek, and their relationship to the action as it may have existed in reality (“aspect,” see Chapter IV), do not arise in English translation, with regard to which forms to choose, because English is not an inflectional language. Form has less influence in English than it does in Greek. The relationship of the imperative itself to the existence of the action in reality is communicated by the context, if at all. It is also likely that for ancient Greek writers and speakers, issues about the kind of action—ingressive, egressive, durative, etc.—were no more a technical grammatical concern than they are for modern writers and speakers. Most do not write or speak conscious of grammatical nuances; they proceed intuitively from known existing circumstances: “they were probably of rather less concern to ancient writers and readers than they are to us.”

With regard to the Greek tense forms used with the third person imperative, the conclusions of this study undermine the interpretive value of the traditional categories, but add little to matters of translation, because these categories have had a minimal (if any) influence on the major translations. Much more work is needed on the concept of “aspect” in the Greek tenses of the imperative before communication of the nuances between the tenses is possible in any receptor language (whether isolating, agglutinative, or inflectional). Therefore, the present and aorist tense forms in the third person imperative have little influence upon translation.

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298 See pp. 5 - 7.
299 I.e., emphatic subject transfers, emphatic object transfers, and conditional constructs, see Chapter II.
300 The imperative of an English verb is always in a present tense form: “Run.” “No running.” “He must run.” “You will not run.” Additionally, according to Curme: “the imperative of all verbs, durative as well as point-action verbs, usually has ingressive force, since the expectation is that the action will be begun or performed at once” (Syntax, 379).
301 Of course, the issue of aspect does arise in English. See, for example, Curme, Grammar, 373 - 383. Therefore, that which is conveyed by the present and aorist Greek forms will be lost to some degree in the English. See Post, “Dramatic Uses,” 31.
304 For example, in the NIV New Testament I was unable to locate one example that suggested the traditional approach was followed. In fact, the opposite occurred. For example, the prescriptive present in 1 Cor 14:30 (ο ρωτος εισειτο) is translated as a prohibitive present according to traditional categories (“the first speaker should stop”). This suggests context, and not tense form, governed the translation.
The second person form is clearly the primary form of the imperative in the Greek Bible.\textsuperscript{305} The choice of a third person form was not chosen out of necessity, because nearly every case could be converted into a second person imperative or some other substitute. Of course, this is the case in most Greek forms that suggests the forms chosen often served a particular purpose.\textsuperscript{306} If such a purpose existed in the author’s mind when choosing the third person imperative over other forms, that purpose appears to have been \textit{emphasis}.\textsuperscript{307} The speaker or writer wanted to place emphasis upon each individual or particular groups within a larger listening or reading audience,\textsuperscript{308} each individual within and beyond the immediate listening or reading audience,\textsuperscript{309} or the object of the responsible party’s actions.\textsuperscript{310} Thus, English translation should reflect these emphases.

Although there is no corresponding form in English for the Greek third person imperative, there are alternatives that convey the same import.\textsuperscript{311} All three English moods—indicative, subjunctive, and (second person) imperative—may be used effectively to communicate the Greek third person imperative. This can be accomplished with or without modal auxiliaries. However, better care translating can be taken than has been demonstrated in the past by choosing English forms that have the proper force.\textsuperscript{312} Also, when the third person imperative provides emphasis, it is best to retain that emphasis as much as possible by carefully choosing English grammatical structures.\textsuperscript{313} In short, a consciousness of both the \textit{level of intensity} and the \textit{subject or object of emphasis} should be maintained in the translation process.

\textsuperscript{305}The ratio of second to third person is 5.4 to 1. In the New Testament it is 6 (1,400) to 1 (234), in the Septuagint 5.3 (5,379) to 1 (1,022).

\textsuperscript{306}This is not to suggest every speaker and writer consciously selected the best possible form for his or her communication.

\textsuperscript{307}Of course it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty an author’s intention. Nevertheless, every third person imperative (in the sources examined) is found in one of the grammatical structures that result in the emphases described.

\textsuperscript{308}Emphatic Subject Transfer - Determinate Nominative Construct (see pp. 23 - 25), and Conditional Constructs - Specified Conditions and Mixed Conditions (see pp. 37 - 40).

\textsuperscript{309}Emphatic Subject Transfer - Indeterminate Nominative Construct (see pp. 25 - 27), and Conditional Constructs - Indefinite Conditions (see pp. 35 - 37).

\textsuperscript{310}Emphatic Object Transfers (see pp. 27 - 35), and Conditional Constructs (see p. 37). The responsible party is generally the listening/reading audience, sometimes including the speaker himself, and rarely a third party.

\textsuperscript{311}There are likewise similar alternatives in Greek. See nn. 101 - 105, 194; Robertson, \textit{Grammar}, 942 - 946; and McKay (\textit{Syntax}, 81 - 84). Henrik Zilliacus considers the question of substitutes in Classical Greek to express “the differences of emotional value in an exhortation or command” (“Notes on the Periphrases of the Imperatives in Classical Greek,” \textit{Eranos} 44 (1946): 267). Although Zilliacus is more concerned with psychological and conventional issues than degrees of responsibility, some of the types of expression he identified could as well be used in English to communicate the Greek imperative: optative or potential forms, future, types of interrogative, condition, and emphatic verbs. McKay rightly notes, however, that the New Testament does not contain contexts favorable to all these expressions (“Aspect in Imperatival Constructions,” 202).

\textsuperscript{312}Of course, force is contextually determined and therefore subject to debate. However, if carefully chosen, the form used to translate should reflect the interpretation.

\textsuperscript{313}For example, the NIV translation of 2 Thess 3:10, “he shall not eat,” is slightly more forceful than the NASB translation, “neither let him eat.” Although addressed to the church, “Don’t support the slacker,” the point is driven home more forcefully by the third person to both the church and particularly the one refusing to work.
In what follows, using the NIV New Testament as a base, I have taken each level of imperative intensity and described briefly the various English forms that best communicate the sense of the Greek. As much as possible, they are discussed in descending order of intensity.\textsuperscript{314} Under each level of intensity examples are examined according to the grammatical structure in which they are classified in order to maintain the proper subject/object emphasis.

Obligatory Level

The best English forms for this level of intensity are the third person subjunctive without a modal auxiliary (simple subjunctive), with the modal auxiliaries “must”\textsuperscript{315} and “shall/will,”\textsuperscript{316} and rarely the third person indicative. Second person imperatives and subjunctives can also be used; however, generally they should be restricted to the apodoses of conditional constructs.

Subject transfers in determinate nominative constructs are often translated with a diminished capacity. When John the Baptist responded to questions from some Jews about avoiding the coming judgment upon Jerusalem, he answered, “The man with two tunics \textit{should} share with him who has none, and the one who has food \textit{should} do the same” (Luke 3:11, NIV). The emphasis upon the focus groups (those possessing an extra tunic and those with food) is maintained, but the force is softened with the modal auxiliary “should.” Considering the subject matter and consequences, John calls for obligatory compliance. This is confirmed by his responses to two specific groups in the crowd raising the same concern. He answers by using two prescriptive second person imperatives (\textit{pra/ssete}, v. 13, and \textit{ajrkeivsqe}, v. 14) and two prohibitive second person subjunctives (\textit{mhde/na diasei/shte mhde/sukofanth/sht}, v. 14).\textsuperscript{317} The intensity of John’s proclamation is communicated better by the NRSV: “Whoever has two coats \textit{must} share with anyone who has none; and whoever has food \textit{must} do likewise.”

The commonly used “unstressed” modal auxiliary “let” is at best ambiguous, generally connoting the idea of permission (or even recommendation), and should be reserved for the hortative level of intensity.\textsuperscript{318} There is no necessity to employ this or any

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\textsuperscript{315}House and Harman claim “(Must) is always indicative,” presumably because of its certainty (\textit{Grammar}, 130). However, Curme discusses it under the subjunctive (\textit{Syntax}, 394 - 395).
\textsuperscript{316}In contrast to “shall” denoting mere futurity, House and Harman state, “When \textit{shall} has the force of \textit{must}, or is used in the expression of obligation, compulsion, or necessity, it may be regarded as a modal auxiliary” (\textit{Grammar}, 131). However, when “shall” is used with the third person only the sense of futurity is certain. For example, “The one among you who is without sin shall be the first to throw a stone at her” (John 8:7). It is not clear whether this action is being commanded or logically follows the condition of being without sin.
\textsuperscript{317}For other passages in the NIV that are softened with the modal auxiliary “should” see Matt 19:12; Luke 22:26; 1 Cor 7:3, 36b; 14:13, 29, 34; 1 Tim 2:11; 1 Pet 4:19. Although the level of intensity is mollified, the grammatical emphasis is generally maintained.
\textsuperscript{318}Curme, \textit{Syntax}, 432 - 433. House and Harman do not consider it under modal auxiliaries (\textit{Grammar}, 96, 128 - 132). It is generally viewed as imperatival only when accompanied by “alone,” “let alone.” Unfortunately, Goetchius uses this auxiliary to illustrate the third person imperative in every possible form, which is misleading for this level grammar (\textit{Language}, 256 - 258). The NIV uses it for 83 of the 234 New Testament third person imperatives, most of which are obligatory in nature.
\end{flushright}
other auxiliary that has less than full imperatival intensity.\(^{319}\) For example, the idiomatic expression ὁ ἔχον ὄτα ὄχοιντο is nearly always translated “He who has ears, let him hear” (Matt 11:15; Luke 14:35; Rev 2:7; etc.).\(^{320}\) Although the grammatical emphasis is nearly retained in a reflexive sense,\(^{321}\) an ambiguity remains and the force is mollified. Both the emphasis and force can be maintained without ambiguity: “He who has ears, must listen.”\(^{322}\)

Likewise, other uses of “let” could be replaced by “must” (“They must come themselves and escort us out,” Acts 16:37);\(^{323}\) or a simple subjunctive (“He who boasts is to boast in the Lord,” 1 Cor 1:31; 2 Cor 10:17).\(^{324}\) A second person imperative is appropriate in a context where the speaker or writer’s intended audience is clearly focused (“You who are without sin, cast the first stone,” John 8:7).\(^{325}\)

As in the previous determinate classification, subject transfers in indeterminate nominative constructs are frequently translated with “let” or “should” when simple third person subjunctives or the modal auxiliary “must” would maintain the emphasis and force better. For example, “Therefore, what God has joined together, let man not separate,” Matt 19:6.\(^{326}\) The NAB has “no human being must separate.” Although the grammar is clumsy, the force is stronger.\(^{327}\)

In some cases, however, the NIV does use the stronger third person subjunctive with “must” (Matt 5:31; Rom 13:1; Eph 5:33). In Acts 2:38 it uses the forceful second person passive imperative “be baptized” with the second person active imperative “repent” while the emphasis upon each individual in the immediate audience is maintained by the following phrase “everyone of you.”\(^{328}\)

In object transfers generally the responsible party for carrying out the imperative is the listening or reading audience defined by a second person construct in the immediate context. The object of the responsible party’s actions is made the subject of the third person imperative for emphasis. Again, the NIV often mollifies it with “let” or “should”; for example, “let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes’” rather than the stronger “Your ‘Yes’ is to be ‘Yes’” or “Your ‘Yes’ must be ‘Yes’” (Matt 5:37).\(^{329}\)

\(^{319}\)Pace Brooks and Winbery, Syntax, 129.

\(^{320}\)See discussion about this expression on p. 25.

\(^{321}\)Stated as a second person, “If you have ears, let yourself hear.”

\(^{322}\)Similarly in Luke 16:29, “They have Moses and the Prophets; they must listen to them.” “Let them listen to them” (NIV) nearly sounds flippant, whereas the NRSV is slightly better on this point, “they should listen to them.”

\(^{323}\)For examples in the NIV see Rom 14:3; Gal 6:6; 1 Tim 3:12; 2 Tim 2:19; 1 Pet 3:10 - 11.

\(^{324}\)For an example in the NIV see 1 Tim 6:2.

\(^{325}\)For examples in the NIV see Luke 22:36; 1 Cor 10:12.

\(^{326}\)For other examples in the NIV see Rom 15:2; 1 Cor 7:2; 17 - 18, 20, 24; 10:24; 11:28 (with “ought”); Gal 6:4; 1 Tim 6:1; Jas 1:13, 19; 1 Pet 4:15.

\(^{327}\)A simple subjunctive would be better, “No one is to separate.”

\(^{328}\)The NIV conjoins the two verbs followed by a comma, thereby individualizing the action in both verbs (so also the NAB). This is in contrast to the KJV, NASB, and NRSV, which place a comma after “repent,” individualizing only “be baptized,” which is closer to the Greek grammar. Interestingly, none of these translations disjoins “be baptized” from the phrase εἰς ἀφεσιν τῶν ῥήματος by punctuation. In fact, the latter three join the phrase to “be baptized” only, placing a comma after “repent” and none between “be baptized” and “for the forgiveness of your sins.” See the extended discussion on this verse on pp. 46 - 50.

\(^{329}\)For other examples in the NIV see Matt 5:16; 6:3; 1 Cor 14:4; Phil 4:5; Col 3:15 - 16; Jas 5:12; 1 Pet 3:3.
Conversely and more frequently, a second person imperative is used maintaining force, but diminishing emphasis: “Do not let sin reign in your mortal body” (Rom 6:12). Paul’s personification of sin is enhanced as the subject of the third person imperative, which is easily communicated with English subjunctives: “Sin must not (is not to) reign in your mortal body.”

In some cases, the NIV retains both the emphasis and force of the Greek: “But say the word, and my servant will be healed” (Luke 7:7), and “Perseverance must finish its work” (Jas 1:4).

In object transfers where the responsible party must be defined by contextual implication rather than a second person construct, the NIV generally retains both the force and emphasis of the Greek. This is accomplished with the modal auxiliaries “must” (“Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death,” Matt 15:4; “must surely die,” NRSV; “shall die,” NAB) and “will” (“It will be done just as you believed it would,” Matt 8:13; 9:29), simple subjunctives (“hallowed be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done,” Matt 6:9 - 10), second person imperatives (“Crucify him!” Matt 27:22 - 23), and third person indicatives (“Your request is granted,” Matt 15:28, and “The elders who direct the affairs of the church are worthy of double honor . . .” 1 Tim 5:17).

Most (47 of 54) of the final classification of third person imperatives, conditional constructs, are, by their very nature, obligatory. Nevertheless, the NIV sometimes softens the force in indefinite conditions with the modal auxiliaries “let” (Mark 4:23; Gal 1:9) and “should” (1 Cor 3:18; 11:34; 1 Tim 5:16). However, in many cases it retains the force as well as the subject emphasis with the modal auxiliaries “must” (“he must not divorce her,” 1 Cor 7:11 - 12; Matt 16:24) and “shall” (“If a man will not work, he shall not eat,” 2 Thess 3:10).

In nearly every case of both specified and mixed conditions the NIV softens either the force or the emphasis with the modal auxiliaries “should” (1 Cor 7:9; 11:6; 14:28, 30, 35; 1 Tim 5:4), “let” (Matt 10:13; Gal 1:8), “can” (Acts 19:38), “may” (Matt 26:42), or second person imperatives (Matt 18:17; Acts 4:9 - 10). In one passage, both force and emphasis are maintained: “But if she does (i.e., divorce), she must remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband” (1 Cor 7:11).

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330For other examples in the NIV see Rom 14:16; 1 Cor 7:21; 16:14; Eph 4:29, 31; Phil 4:6; Heb 13:1; Jas 4:9; 1 John 2:24.
331So also, the NASB and KJV, but the NRSV and NAB weaken the force with “let.”
332Most other translations use “let.”
333The force is softened in only four of twenty occurrences in this category (Acts 1:20c; Rom 3:4; 1 Tim 5:16).
334See also 1 Cor 14:26; 1 Tim 3:10; and Titus 3:14.
335See also Luke 22:42.
336See n. 224.
337In one case, it converts the protasis into a relative clause, “Whoever serves me must follow me” (John 12:26).
338“May” can have an obligatory force as in 1 Tim 5:9 (“No widow may be put on the list of widows unless she is over sixty”).
Hortative Level

The modal auxiliaries “ought” and “should” are generally understood to have an obligatory force:

*Ought* denotes obligation, and is a stronger expression of obligation than *should*, but not so strong as *must* . . . *should* is similar to *must* and *ought*, but does not express the compulsion which *must* denotes, nor the moral obligation or duty of *ought.*  

There is a sense that when a speaker or writer uses these auxiliaries there is a mollification of force: “*should* is frequently used to express obligation modestly or politely.” The speaker often speaks without authority: “Jesus’ brothers said to him, “You *ought* to leave here and go to Judea, so that your disciples may see the miracles you do (John 7:3; see also Acts 25:24). For these reasons, plus the fact that there is no lack of forceful English forms that may be chosen for an obligatory force, these auxiliaries should be reserved for the hortative level.

Accordingly, the strongest English form on the hortative level is a third person subjunctive with the modal auxiliary “ought,” but because it has the sense of moral obligation, it is not the best choice for the passages being considered. On the other hand, in passages where the thrust is exhortation the auxiliary “should” is most appropriate. The auxiliary “let,” indiscriminately used to translate the third person imperative, should be reserved for this level (see above pp. 62 - 63), but it is less forceful than “should.” Weaker than “let,” but possibilities for imperatives as permission, are third person subjunctives with the modal auxiliaries “can” or “may.”

In nearly every case, the NIV uses the forms suggested here, thus maintaining the proper force and emphasis. However, in two object transfers in second person constructs (John 14:1, 27) and in one indefinite condition (Jas 5:20), second person imperatives are also used, retaining the force but diminishing the emphasis.

The subject transfers in Matt 24:15 - 18 (and pars.) are warnings and could be stronger than the NIV translation suggests (“Let no one on the roof of his house go down . . .”), even as it translates the similar context in Luke 17:31 (“no one who is on the roof of his house . . . *should* go down”). Paul warns his readers, “Let no one deceive you with empty words” (Eph 5:6). This is an object transfer in which the subject of the imperative (the deceivers) needs emphasis, but the force of the warning should be

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340Ibid. 132.
342Especially in Jas 5:20 where the exhortation is addressed specifically to the one who helps in the restoration of the wandering brother (from the protasis in v. 19). Jas 5:20 and John 7:37 are the only two indefinite conditional constructs on the hortative level.
343See pp. 43 - 45 for the categories of hortative imperatives.
344The NAB and NRSV show, more forcefully, the urgency with the auxiliary “must” (“a person on the housetop must not go down”), but this nearly suggests obligation.
directed at the readers. A second person imperative could add this force: “Do not let any one deceive you with empty words.”

The one permissive third person imperative (1 Cor 7:15) is nearly always translated, as in the NIV, with “let” taken to mean “allow”: “But if the unbeliever leaves, let him do so.”

Optative Level

The best modal auxiliary to express this level of intensity (wish or desire) is “may.” There are only six passages I classified as having this force. Five are in prayers (Matt 26:39; Acts 1:20a, 20b; Rom 11:9 - 10), and in each case, but one, the NIV uses “may,” retaining both the force and emphasis. The statement in Acts 21:14 is translated appropriately by nearly every version as a simple third person passive subjunctive, which is the strongest optative form: “The Lord’s will be done.”

There are a number of English forms available to convey the meaning and function of the Greek third person imperative. If there have been weaknesses in the major translations, they include the overuse of the auxiliaries “let” and “should” in obligatory contexts, and the failure to maintain both the proper imperatival force and the third person emphasis in the Greek form. However, in the end, the reader is responsible to examine the sense of the imperative in its context, which must ultimately engender one’s final understanding.

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345 As is generally true in object transfers. See p. 30, n. 162 for comments on Eph 5:6, and pp. 43 - 45 for the only other object transfer on the hortative level (Rev 22:11).

346 All are object transfers, one of which is in a specified condition (Matt 26:39); four are from Old Testament quotes.

347 In Acts 1:20a, b two object transfers are in immediate succession. The NIV changes from the auxiliary “may” in the first to “let” in the second, probably for rhetorical reasons. “Let” is a little stronger than “may,” and is possibly better in a context where urgency is involved, as in most other translations of Matt 26:39 (“My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me.” NASB, NRSV, NAB).
### APPENDIX A

#### OCCURRENCES OF THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

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Superscripts indicate number of occurrences in the verse. Total occurrences: 234.
APPENDIX B

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THIRD PERSON IMPERATIVE

EMPHATIC SUBJECT TRANSFER (114)

Subject Defined by Determinate Nominative Construct (75)

Matt 11:15; 13:9, 43; 19:12; 24:15\textsuperscript{H}, 16\textsuperscript{H}, 17\textsuperscript{H}, 18\textsuperscript{H}; 27:42; Mark 13:14\textsuperscript{H}, 14\textsuperscript{H}, 15\textsuperscript{H}, 15\textsuperscript{H}, 16\textsuperscript{H}, 15:32; Luke 3:11, 11; 8:8; 14:35; 16:29; 17:31\textsuperscript{b}, 21:21\textsuperscript{H}, 21\textsuperscript{H}, 21\textsuperscript{H}, 22:26, 36, 36, 36; John 8:7; Acts 2:36; 16:37; 24:20; Rom 14:3, 3; 1 Cor 1:31; 7:3, 36b; 10:12; 14:13, 29, 29, 34, 34; 2 Cor 10:11, 17; Gal 6:6; Eph 4:28, 28; 1 Tim 2:11; 3:10b, 12; 6:2, 2; 2 Tim 2:19; Heb 1:6; Jas 1:7, 9; 5:14b; 1 Pet 3:10, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11; 4:19; Rev 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22, 13:18; 22:17\textsuperscript{H}, 17\textsuperscript{H}, 17\textsuperscript{H}

Subject Defined by Indeterminate Nominative Construct (39)

Matt 5:31; 19:6; Mark 4:9; 10:9; Luke 17:31\textsuperscript{aH}; Acts 2:38; Rom 13:1; 14:5; 15:2, 11; 1 Cor 3:10, 18a, 21; 4:1; 7:2, 2, 17, 18, 18, 20, 24; 10:24; 11:28, 28, 28, 16:2; Gal 6:4, 17; Eph 5:33; 1 Tim 4:12; 6:1; Titus 2:15; Jas 1:13, 19; 3:13; 5:13, 13, 14a; 1 Pet 4:15

EMPHATIC OBJECT TRANSFER (66)

Subject Defined by Second Person Construct (41)

Matt 5:16, 37; 6:3; 9:30; Luke 7:7; 12:35; John 14:1\textsuperscript{H}, 27\textsuperscript{H}, 27\textsuperscript{H}; Acts 2:14; 13:38; 28:28; Rom 6:12; 14:16; 1 Cor 7:21; 14:40; 16:14; 2 Cor 12:16; Eph 4:26, 29, 31; 5:3, 6\textsuperscript{H}; Phil 4:5-6; Col 2:16, 18; 3:15-16; Heb 13:1; Jas 1:4; 4:9; 5:12; 1 Pet 3:3; 2 Pet 3:8; 1 John 2:24; 3:7; Rev 22:11\textsuperscript{H}, 11\textsuperscript{H}, 11\textsuperscript{H}, 11\textsuperscript{H}

Subject Defined by Contextual Implication (25)

Matt 6:9-10, 10; 8:13; 9:29; 15:4, 28; 27:22-23; Mark 7:10; Luke 11:2, 2; 22:42; Acts 1:20\textsuperscript{aO}, 20b\textsuperscript{b}, 20c; 21:14\textsuperscript{O}; Rom 3:4; 11:9\textsuperscript{O}, 10\textsuperscript{O}; 1 Cor 14:26; 1 Tim 3:10a; 5:16b-17; Titus 3:14

CONDITIONAL CONSTRUCTS (54)

Indefinite Conditions (31)

Matt 16:24, 24, 24; Mark 4:23; 8:34, 34, 34; Luke 9:23, 23, 23; John 7:37\textsuperscript{H}, 37\textsuperscript{H}, 12:26; 1 Cor 3:18b; 7:12-13, 36a; 11:34; 14:27, 37; 16:22; 2 Cor 10:7; Gal 1:9; 2 Thess 3:10; 1 Tim 5:16a; Jas 1:5-6; 5:20\textsuperscript{H}; 1 Pet 4:16, 16; Rev 13:9

Specified Conditions (16)

Matt 18:17; 26:39\textsuperscript{O}, 42; 27:43\textsuperscript{H}; Luke 23:35\textsuperscript{H}; Acts 19:38; 1 Cor 7:9, 11, 11, 15\textsuperscript{H}, 11:6a; 14:28, 28, 35; Gal 1:8; 1 Tim 5:9

Mixed Conditions (7)

Matt 10:13, 13; Acts 4:9 - 10; 25:5; 1 Cor 11:6b; 14:30; 1 Tim 5:4

\textsuperscript{340}Superscripts indicate imperative has only hortative (\textsuperscript{H}) or optative (\textsuperscript{O}) force.
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